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INTRODUCTION
Today, it is widely agreed that the tragic events of September 11, 2001
changed everything. With almost three thousand innocents killed, and almost as
many injured, the tragedy marked an unprecedented and highly lethal develop-
ment, presumably demanding an equally novel legal response. The U.S. govern-
ment, however, as it had in the wake of the bombings of the Murrah Federal
Building in Oklahoma City (1995), and the U.S. Embassy in Kenya (1998),
pursued a decidedly orthodox path, prosecuting Zacarias Moussaoui, the sole
defendant apprehended in connection with September 11, in federal criminal
court for capital murder.'
With this strategic choice, the United States imported the trappings of its
criminal justice system, a system which has, over the past twenty-five years,
increasingly incorporated input from victims on guilt and punishment deci-
sions.2 The upshot has been a melding of the era of victims' rights and the age
of terror,3 obliging a legal system conceived and operated under conventional
circumstances to respond to unique depravity, human suffering, and material
destruction.
This Article examines a particular aspect of this convergence: the use in mass
killing prosecutions of victim impact evidence (VIE)-information on dece-
dents' personal traits and the ways in which their deaths have adversely affected
1. The United States has also advanced military commissions as a potential accountability mecha-
nism. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006). To date, however, no such proceedings have
taken place, despite authorizing legislation from Congress and recently adopted governing rules. See
Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 3(a), 120 Stat. 2600 (to be codified at 10
U.S.C. §§ 948b, 949a); DEP'T OF DEF., MANUAL FOR MILIARY COMNUSSIONS (2007) (setting forth
procedural and evidentiary rules for military commissions as well as substantive elements of crimes
that may be punishable by commissions).
2. See Peggy M. Tobolowsky, Victim Participation in the Criminal Justice Process: Fifteen Years
After the President's Task Force on Victims of Crime, 25 NEw ENG. J. ON Ctm. & Civ. CoNFIEMENT 2 1,
21-23 (1999) (describing the emergence of the victim's movement in the 1970s).
3. See George W. Bush, President of the U.S., President Calls for Crime Victims' Rights Amend-
ment, Speech at the United States Department of Justice (Apr. 16, 2002) ("In our war against terror, I
constantly remind our fellow citizens .... [that] [w]e seek justice for victims. We seek justice for their
families.").
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those left behind. Available for use since the Supreme Court's landmark 1991
decision in Payne v. Tennessee,4 VIE is said to serve two chief purposes: first, it
allows death decisions to be based on the "specific harm caused by a defen-
dant," affording the sentencing authority greater understanding into the defen-
dant's moral culpability and blameworthiness; 5 second, it highlights that murder
victims are not "'faceless stranger[s],'" permitting the government to muster
the "full moral force of its evidence" in capital prosecutions.7
Although VIE has come to figure centrally in U.S. capital trials, it continues
to inspire debate and. controversy. To date, however, commentators have fo-
cused exclusively on trials involving single or perhaps double-homicides (as in
Payne), not mass killings, with their catastrophically greater harms and distinct
legal, social, and political circumstances. This Article marks the first effort to
examine the role of VIE in such prosecutions, highlighting the many unique
difficulties its use presents. Given the likely continued terrorist targeting of
Americans, the insights provided here have critical importance for U.S. domes-
tic policy. Yet because such calamities will also continue to beset the interna-
tional community, which itself is showing increased sensitivity to victims'
rights, the discussion here has global significance as well.
The Article contains five parts. Part I provides an overview of the jurispruden-
tial history and use of VIE in the United States, from its initial invalidation on
Eighth Amendment grounds (on two occasions) by the Supreme Court to its
resurrection in Payne and subsequent widespread adoption by state and federal
courts. Part I examines the mass killing trials in which VIE has been admitted:
the capital prosecutions of Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols for the Okla-
homa City bombing (168 deaths); Mohamed Rashed Daoud Al-'Owhali for the
bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya (213 deaths); and Zacarias
Moussaoui for the events of September 11 (just under 3,000 deaths). In each
proceeding, the U.S. government employed massive amounts of VIE, provided
by dozens of witnesses of diverse backgrounds who offered highly emotional
and compelling testimony on the personal traits of decedents and the myriad
ways in which the tragedies had adversely affected their lives.
Part III compares the use of VIE in mass killing prosecutions with that in
more conventional capital trials. While mass killing can be thought sui generis,
due to the scope of death and destruction they cause and the political motiva-
tions often inspiring defendants, government use of VIE in their prosecution
casts in new light many traditional concerns raised over VIE, in some respects
mitigating such concerns and in others exacerbating them. Part Il concludes'by
considering the fundamental question of whether VIE has a proper place in
mass killing trials at all. Indeed, in such trials, Payne's core retributive tenet that
4. 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
5. Id. at 825, 827.
6. Id. at 825 (quoting South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 821 (1989) (O'Connor, J., dissent-
ing)).
7. Id. at 825.
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gravity of harm is central to assessing culpability can be said simply to prove
too much. How can it be that anything short of death is justified when hundreds
or thousands of innocents have perished at the hands of the defendant? Further-
more, in the face of such devastation, it strains credulity to believe that VIE is
necessary to ensure that the government is not deprived of the "full moral force
of its evidence."'
Surprisingly, however, despite what might be thought of as the preordained
outcome of the U.S. mass killing trials surveyed-the imposition of a death
sentence-the government's record of success with VIE is less than impressive.
Only Timothy McVeigh was sentenced to death. In light of this, the discussion
in Part IV centers on the broader instrumental benefits of VIE in mass killing
prosecutions, in particular, its critically important didactic function. As recog-
nized since the historic Nuremberg trials of Nazi defendants in the aftermath of
World War II, courtrooms afford a highly valuable forum to generate a public
historical record in the wake of mass killings.
VIE expands this opportunity in unique ways, to the advantage of govern-
ment and victims alike. 9 This benefit was readily evident in the Moussaoui
trial, where the U.S. government and New York City (embodied in VIE witness
Rudolph Giuliani, ex-Mayor of New York) were permitted to cast themselves
as sufferers of terrorist savagery, affording a counterweight to persistent as-
sertions that their lack of readiness exacerbated (or even allowed) the events of
9/11.10 Victims, meanwhile, were similarly able to re-assert and instantiate their
status as worthy innocents, permitting their rehabilitation from recurrent public
portrayals as greedy and ungrateful beneficiaries of the 9/11 Compensation
Fund."
After surveying the role of VIE in U.S. mass killing prosecutions, the Article
turns to the question of whether VIE should play a role in international criminal
prosecutions of mass killers. To set the parameters of the discussion, Part V
examines two of history's most noted trials, the Nuremberg Tribunal and
Israel's prosecution of Adolf Eichmann. While each sought to redress Nazi
atrocities and render a historical record, the trials went about doing so in very
different ways. Whereas in Nuremberg prosecutors relied almost entirely on
documents and exalted legalism, in Eichmann, like the U.S. mass killing trials
surveyed, highly emotional testimony from victims served as the government's
evidentiary mainstay. The respective approaches have been the subject of
considerable critical commentary over the years-most notably from Hannah
8. Id.
9. "Victim," unless otherwise indicated, is used broadly here to include direct victims (for example,
decedents and those who were injured yet survived) and indirect victims (for example, family
members) who themselves were not killed or injured yet suffer emotional and other kinds of harm as a
result of a killing.
10. See infra notes 246-59 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 260-74 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 96:721
2008] CONFRONTING EvIL: VIcTIms' RIGHTS IN AN AGE OF ThRROR 725
Arendt' 2-- casting in bold relief the essential political character of the criminal
prosecution process.' 3
Viewed in these terms, the propriety of VIE ultimately presents the interna-
tional legal community with a normative political question: whether the pathos
of victims should be permitted to infuse legal processes and decision making.
While the U.S. response to this question has been in the affirmative, for reasons
discussed, the international community would be well advised to exercise
restraint if it wishes to secure and maintain the perceived legitimacy of its trial
and punishment of those involved in the mass killing of innocents.
I. ORIGINS AND USE OF VIE IN U.S. COURTS
A. BOOTH V. MARYLAND AND SOUTH CAROLINA V. GATHERS
In Booth v. Maryland,14 the Supreme Court addressed whether a Maryland
statute permitting the government to introduce information relating to the
personal characteristics of a murder victim and the emotional impact of the
killing on the victim's family violated the Eighth Amendment.' 5 Writing for the
majority, Justice Powell referred to the information as "irrelevant" and flatly
rejected the State's assertion that it was needed to allow the sentencing authority
to assess the "gravity" of the offense. 16 According to Justice Powell, the
information improperly served to refocus the sentencing decision from the
defendant and his criminal act to "the character and reputation of the victim and
the effect on his family," despite the fact that the defendant was perhaps wholly
unaware of the personal qualities of the victim. 7 In so doing, Justice Powell
asserted, the State created "a constitutionally unacceptable risk that the jury
may impose the death penalty in an arbitrary and capricious manner" in
violation of the Eighth Amendment.18
Two years later, in South Carolina v. Gathers,'9 the Court addressed yet
another Eighth Amendment challenge to VIE, this time involving an emotional
closing argument by a prosecutor that praised, inter alia, the religiosity and
civic-mindedness of the decedent, a self-styled "Reverend Minister. '20 Al-
12. See, e.g., HANNAH AaNDT, EIcuIMAsN IN JERuSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALrrY OF EvIL 19
(Penguin Books 1994) (1963).
13. As Judith Shklar observed, the legal process is inseparable from politics; the question is not
whether the law is political, but instead whether the political values that it serves warrant endorsement.
JUDITH N. SHKLAR, LEGALISM: LAW, MoRALs, AND POLITICAL TImALS 144 (1964); see also Vivian
Grosswald Curran, Politicizing the Crime Against Humanity: The French Example, 78 NoTRE DAME L.
REv. 677, 678 (2003) (noting that "although law and politics are not identical, they are inseparable.
Their inseparability has proven to be one of a very few reliable universals of our world").
14. 482 U.S. 496 (1987).
15. Id. at 501-02.
16. Id. at 503-05.
.17. Id. at 504-05.
18. Id. at 503.
19. 490 U.S. 805 (1989).
20. Id. at 808-10.
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though not entailing testimony from surviving family members, as in Booth, the
Court considered the statements "indistinguishable" in their arbitrary nature and
potential effect.21 Permitting the jury to consider the victim's traits, the five-
member Gathers majority held, "'could result in imposing the death sentence
because of factors about which the defendant was unaware, and that were
irrelevant to the decision to kill.'
22
B. PAYNE V. TENNESSEE
Despite the unequivocal holding of Booth, the State of Tennessee employed
VIE in its 1988 capital trial of Pervis Payne for the stabbing deaths of Charisse
Christopher and her two-year-old daughter Lacie Jo. After Payne was convicted
of both murder counts, the State presented the testimony of Ms. Christopher's
mother, who testified during the sentencing phase how her grandson Nicholas,
who himself had been non-fatally stabbed by Payne and witnessed the gruesome
events, had been affected by the murders of his mother and sister:
He cries for his mom. He doesn't seem to understand why she doesn't come
home. And he cries for his sister Lacie. He comes to me many times during
the week and asks me, Grandma, do you miss my Lacie. And I tell him yes.
He says I'm worried about my Lacie.23
The prosecutor elaborated on Nicholas' physical and emotional harms during
his closing argument, and offered during his rebuttal that:
His mother will never kiss him good night or pat him as he goes off to bed, or
hold him and sing him a lullaby.
[Petitioner's attorney] .... doesn't want you to think about the people who
love Charisse Christopher, her mother and daddy who loved her. The people
who loved little Lacie Jo, the grandparents who are still here. The brother who
mourns for her every single day and wants to know where his best little
playmate is. He doesn't have anybody to watch cartoons with him, a little one.
These are the things that.. . that child will carry forever.
24
The jury sentenced Payne to death on both murder counts, the Supreme Court
of Tennessee affirmed,25 and the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to
reconsider its prior rejection of VIE.26 Over the vigorous dissents of Justices
Stevens and Marshall, with Justice Marshall describing the majority's opinion
21. Id. at 811.
22. Id. (quoting Booth, 482 U.S. at 505).
23. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 814-15 (1991).
24. Id. at 816.
25. State v. Payne, 791 S.W.2d 10, 19 (Tenn. 1990) (holding that, assuming prosecutor's argument
violated Eighth Amendment, admission of victim impact evidence was harmless error).
26. Payne, 501 U.S. at 817.
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as the triumph of "[plower, not reason, 27 a six-member majority of the Court
reversed Booth and Gathers, in part 2 8 and affirmed Payne's death sentence.29
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist first disputed the premise of
Booth and Gathers that "evidence relating to a particular victim or to the harm
that a capital defendant causes a victim's family" is immaterial to a capital
decision.30 Rather, harm traditionally has played a role in assessing culpability
in punishment decisions; although this "particular kind of evidence--designed
to portray for the sentencing authority the actual harm caused by a particular
crime-is of recent origin, this fact hardly renders it unconstitutional., 3 ' Accord-
ing to the Chief Justice, "[v]ictim impact evidence is simply another form or
method of informing the sentencing authority about the specific harm caused by
the crime in question, evidence of a general type long considered by sentencing
authorities. ''32
A second, more practical reason for admitting VIE was to "keep the balance
true" in the capital decision-making process.33 Because the Court's prior prece-
dent granted capital defendants the virtual unfettered right to proffer mitigating
evidence, in the name of showing their "uniqueness" and lessened personal
culpability,34 fairness dictated that evidence relating to the uniqueness of the
lives taken by defendants be considered as well.35 Citing Justice White's dissent
in Booth, Chief Justice Rehnquist endorsed the potential leveling effect of
apprising the sentencing authority of the personal traits of victims and the losses
suffered by survivors:
[T]he state has a legitimate interest in counteracting the mitigating evidence
which the defendant is entitled to put in, by reminding the sentencer that just
as the murderer should be considered as an individual, so too the victim is an
individual whose death represents a unique loss to society and in particular to
his family.
3 6
To the Payne majority, Booth "unfairly weighted the scales in a capital
trial,"37 insofar as precluding VIE "deprives the State of the full moral force of
27. Id. at 844 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
28. The majority left intact two prohibitions contained in Booth: witness recommendations on the
sentence that should be imposed and witness characterizations of the defendant and the crime. See id. at
830 n.2.
29. Id. at 830.
30. Id. at 819.
31. Id. at 821.
32. Id. at 825.
33. Id. at 827 (citing Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 122 (1934) (Cardozo, J.)).
34. See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 602-03 (1978) (holding that the sentencing authority
cannot be precluded from considering "any aspect of the defendant's character or record").
35. Payne, 501 U.S. at 826 ("[T]here is nothing unfair about allowing the jury to bear in mind that
harm at the same time as it considers the mitigating evidence introduced by the defendant.").
36. Id. at 825 (quoting Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 517 (White, J., dissenting)).
37. Id. at 809.
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its evidence and may prevent the jury from having before it all the information
necessary to determine the proper punishment for a first-degree murder., 38 The
government, in short, must be permitted to offer "a quick glimpse of the life
which a defendant 'chose to extinguish.' 39 For identical reasons, the majority




Notwithstanding Payne's ostensibly neutral position on its use,4 1 VIE has
come to play a central role in the sentencing phase of U.S. capital trials.
42
Today, the federal government, U.S. military, and thirty-five of the thirty-eight
capital states authorize use of VIE in death penalty sentencing proceedings.43
This rapid embrace of VIE has come as no surprise, given the perceived
strategic value to prosecutors of augmenting their arsenal of aggravating circum-
stances with such an emotionally compelling form of evidence. The popularity
of VIE can also be explained by the humanistic appeal of affording a "voice" to
those silenced by their killers,' 4 and the prospect that the healing.process for
survivors will be advanced by providing an opportunity to testify publicly about
their loSS, 4 5 both goals of the politically powerful victims' rights movement. 46
Consistent with Payne's sole admonition that VIE not be so "unduly prejudi-
cial that it renders the trial fundamentally unfair" for purposes of Fourteenth
Amendment due process analysis, 47 VIE has enjoyed virtually unconstrained
38. Id. at 825.
39. Id. at 822 (quoting Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 397 (1988) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)).
40. See id. at 827.
41. i ("We thus hold that if the State chooses to permit the admission of victim impact evidence
... the Eighth Amendment erects no per se bar.").
42. See United States v. Sampson, 332 F. Supp. 2d 325, 338 (D. Mass. 2004) (noting that VIE has
become a "regular, legitimate feature" of capital trials).
43. Kenji Yoshino, The City and the Poet, 114 YALE L.J. 1835, 1869 (2005).
44. See Payne, 501 U.S. at 832 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (observing that "'[m]urder is the ultimate
act of depersonalization.' It transforms a living person with hopes, dreams and fears into a corpse,
thereby taking away all that is special and unique about the person. The Constitution does not preclude
a State from deciding to give some of that back." (citation omitted)).
45. See Linda G. Mills, The Justice of Recovery: How the State Can Heal the Violence of Crime, 57
HASTINGs L.J. 457, 483 (2006).
46. See Payne, 501 U.S. at 834 (Scalia, J., concurring) (asserting that Booth's characterization of
VIE as "irrelevant" was in direct "conflict[] with a public sense of justice keen enough that it has found
voice in a nationwide 'victims' rights' movement"); see also DAvm GARLAND, Tm CuLTuRE OF
CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 121 (2001) ("[V]ictims have become a
favoured constituency and the aim of serving victims has become part of the redefined mission of all
criminal justice agencies."); Lynn N. Henderson, The Wrongs of Victims' Rights, 37 STAN. L. REv. 937,
952 (1985) (posing the rhetorical question: "Who could be anti-victim?"). For discussion of the
participatory goals of the victims' rights movement, see Tobolowsky, supra note 2, at 21, 30 (noting
that the movement "emphasized making the crime victim an integral part of the criminal justice process
once again," through such procedures as allowing the victim to testify at sentencing hearings about the
personal effects of crime).
47. Payne, 501 U.S. at 825.
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use.48 Much as in the states, in the federal system-where mass killing prosecu-
tions have thus far taken place-VIE is generously admitted.49 Although not
expressly designated a statutory aggravating factor,50 18 U.S.C. § 3593-the
section of the Federal Death Penalty Act (FDPA) that governs capital sentencing
procedures-identifies VIE as a factor upon which the government can rely.
5
'
In the event that the sentencing authority unanimously finds that the govern-
ment has established beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of at least one
statutory aggravating factor, VIE can be considered in the capital decision.52
Congress, however, refrained from specifying who is eligible to testify, the
number of witnesses allowed, and the types of harm that can be considered. The
FDPA merely provides that the government can adduce evidence that "may
include factors concerning the effect of the offense on the victim and the
victim's family"53 and that such evidence "may include ... a victim impact
statement that identifies the victim of the offense and the extent and scope of the
injury and loss suffered by the victim and the victim's family, and any other
relevant information., 54 The federal Crime Victims' Rights Act, while ensuring
a right of crime victims to provide input at sentencing,55 adds only that a victim
is "a person directly and proximately harmed" by a criminal offense.56
Even though by its terms the FDPA alludes only to "the victim and the
victim's family," 57 federal courts have permitted testimony from a broad array
of others, including teachers, neighbors, school classmates, friends, and co-
workers.58 In United States v. Allen,5 9 for instance, a capital trial involving the
death of a security guard during a failed armed bank robbery, the government
offered eleven VIE witnesses, including a former co-worker, two bank employ-
48. For discussion of the expansive forms of VIE admitted in state capital trials, see Wayne A.
Logan, Through the Past Darkly: A Survey of the Uses and Abuses of Victim Impact Testimony in
Capital Trials, 41 ARIz. L. REV. 143, 151-53 (1999).
49. See United States v. Gilbert, 120 F. Supp. 2d 147, 149 (D. Mass 2000) ("Congress has not
provided specific guidelines for the admissibility of [VIE]. Rather, it has entrusted trial judges both with
substantial responsibility and with broad discretion to act as guardians of the sentencing process.").
50. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3592(c) (West 2000 & Supp. 2007) (identifying aggravating factors for capital
crimes).
51. See 18 U.S.C. § 3593(a) (2000); United States v. Davis, 912 F. Supp. 938, 947 (E.D. La. 1996)
(identifying VIE as a non-statutory aggravator in federal capital proceedings).
52. See 18 U.S.C. § 3593(a), (d), (e) (2000).
53. Id. § 3593(a).
54. Id.
55. Id. § 3771(a)(4) (Supp. IV 2006).
56. Id. § 377 1(e) (Supp. IV 2006).
57. Id. § 3593(a). For fuller discussion of the gamut of individuals permitted to testify, see Wayne A.
Logan, Victim Impact Evidence in Federal Capital Trials, 19 FED. SEawr'G RaP. 5, 7 (2006).
58. See, e.g., United States v. Nelson, 347 F.3d 701, 713-14 (8th Cir. 2003) (teacher, neighbor, and
classmate); United States v. Bernard, 299 F.3d 467, 478 (5th Cir. 2002) (friend and former co-worker);
United States v. Allen, 247 F.3d 741, 779 (8th Cir. 2001) (co-worker and former co-worker), vacated on
other grounds, 536 U.S. 953 (2002); United States v. Paul, 217 F.3d 989, 995, 1002 (8th Cir. 2000)
(co-worker).
59. 247 F.3d 741 (8th Cir. 2001).
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ees, and the decedent's ex-wife. 60 Meanwhile, in United States v. Barnette,61 a
prosecution for a double-murder, the government called seven VIE witnesses,62
and in United States v. Sampson,63 the court decided without elaboration that
three to four family members for each decedent could testify in a charged
double-murder.64
Likewise, the definitional scope of "impact" has been noticeably indefinite,
with substantive law again providing only modest help. Federal courts have
permitted evidence well beyond the FDPA's express allowance for information
on the "injury and loss suffered by the victim and the victim's family,"65 again
presumably (though not expressly) relying upon its catch-all reference to "and
any other relevant information. 66 In United States v. Battle,67 for instance,
three prison guards were permitted to testify of the impact the killing of a fellow
guard had on the atmosphere of a federal prison.68 The Eleventh Circuit allowed
the testimony because it conveyed that the murder did not "simply[] take a life,"
but also emboldened other prisoners to harass guards and increased "stresses on
prison staff (making them feel less safe)." 69 More recently, the Ninth Circuit
approved of VIE from three witnesses on how the murder of a Navajo grand-
mother had denied the transmission of tribal heritage, tradition, and practice to
her children and grandchildren, 70 and a federal district court in Kansas approved
of VIE on the effect the murder of a local sheriff had on the sheriff's depart-
ment.71 Finally, in a capital trial for attempted espionage involving no deaths,
the Eastern District of Virginia rejected a vagueness challenge to VIE regarding
"[t]hreats to national security," 72 noting that such threats "are not obtuse
60. Id. at 779.
61. 211 F3d 803 (4th Cir. 2000).
62. See id. at 808, 818.
63. 335 F. Supp. 2d 166 (D. Mass. 2004).
64. Id. at 189.
65. 18 U.S.C. § 3595(a) (2000). Payne itself variously refers to the harms caused a "victim's family"
and the "loss to the victim's family and to society." Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 819, 822 (1991);
see also id. at 830 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (referring to the "impact on the victim's family and
community"); id. at 835 (Souter, J., concurring) (referring to "the impact of the crime on the victim's
survivors"). More recently, in United States v. Jones, 527 U.S. 373 (1999), the Court characterized VIE
as addressing the impact on "the victim's family" and "friends." Id. at 395, 401.
66. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(a). Again, only a handful of states have specified what can be deemed
"impact." See Logan, supra note 48, at 162 &'n.115.
67. 173 F.3d 1343 (11th Cir. 1999).
68. Id. at 1348, 1349.
69. Id. at 1348 n.6, 1350. Federal trial courts, in New York at least, appear more ambivalent on the
admission of what might be called "institutional" VIE. Compare United States v. Wilson, 493 F. Supp.
2d 364, 395-96 (E.D.N.Y 2006) (allowing VIE on "chilling effect" that killing of two undercover
police detectives had on the city's other undercover detectives), with United States v. Quinones, No. 00
CR.761(JSR), 2004 WL 1234044, at *3 n.2 (S.D.N.Y 2004) (demurring on the admissibility of VIE on
"the impact that the defendants' alleged crimes supposedly had on the New York Police Department").
70. See United States v. Mitchell, 502 F.3d 931, 989 (9th Cir. 2007).
71. See United States v. Cheever, 423 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1209-11 (D. Kan. 2006).
72. United States v. Regan, 228 F. Supp. 2d 742, 752 (E.D. Va. 2002).
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principles, and the potential victims are clear.",
73
Finally, while the FDPA references only VIE that "identifies the victim of the
offense,",74 federal courts are similarly predisposed to admit freely personal trait
evidence.75 In United States v. Hall,76 for instance, the Fifth Circuit condoned
VIE relating that the victim was an aspiring doctor.77 In United States v.
Bernard,78 another Fifth Circuit panel, citing Justice Souter's concurring opin-
ion in Payne that approved of "contextual evidence"' relating to victims,
7 9
upheld admission of evidence that the victims were "youth ministers who were
attending a revival meeting" on the day they were killed.80 Because religion
figured centrally in the victims' lives, the court concluded, "it would be impos-
sible to describe their 'uniqueness as individual human beings' without refer-
ence to their faith."81
In sum, over the past fifteen years VIE has enjoyed virtually unhindered
expansion and use, far surpassing in quality and scope that employed in Booth,
Gathers, and Payne. It has become, in the words of Judge Richard Matsch, "the
most problematic[] of the aggravating factors and may present the greatest
difficulty in determining" the nature and scope of the information to be present-
ed.82 The next section addresses the ways in which VIE has been employed in
the U.S. government's prosecution of mass killings in particular, a context that
amply justifies the foregoing characterization.
II. VIE IN U.S. MASS KILLING TRIALS
While the United States is certainly no stranger to mass killings,83 the era
since the mid-1990s has been especially lethal. This section provides a brief
overview of the capital prosecutions of defendants charged with committing
these acts, with special emphasis on the federal government's use of VIE in
such trials.
73. Id.
74. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(a) (2000).
75. For example, parsing the language of § 3593(a), the Tenth Circuit recently elaborated on its
rationale for admitting personal trait VIE, stating that "use of the phrases 'may include' and 'any other
relevant information' clearly suggests that Congress intended to permit the admission of ... evidence
giving the jury a glimpse of the victim's personality and the life he led." United States v. Barrett, 496
F.3d 1079, 1099 (10th Cir. 2007).
76. 152 F.3d 381 (5th Cir. 1998).
77. Id. at 405.
78. 299 F.3d 467 (5th Cir. 2002).
79. Id. at 479 (citing Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 842 (1991) (Souter, J., concurring)).
80. Id.
81. Id. (quoting Payne, 501 U.S. at 823) (alteration to original in quoted text).
82. United States v. McVeigh, 958 F Supp. 512, 513 (D. Colo. 1997).
83. See, e.g., People v. Schmidt, 165 P. 555, 557-58 (Cal. Ct. App. 1917) (dynamiting of newspaper
offices in 1910 by union sympathizers, resulting in twenty-one dead); GEE WniKNs, THE BATH SCHOOL
DISASTER 14-15 (2002) (dynamiting of primary school in 1927 by disgruntled taxpayer, resulting in 45
dead and 58 injured); Beverly Gage, The First Wall Street Bomb, HIsT. NEws SERvIcE, available at
http:/lwww.h-net.org/hns/articles/2001/091701a.html (dynamiting of Wall Street in 1920 allegedly by
anarchists or communists, resulting in forty dead).
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A. UNITED STATES V MCVEIGH AND UNITED STATES V NICHOLS
On April 19, 1995, a rented Ryder truck, packed with two tons of ammonium
nitrate and fuel oil, parked just below a second-floor day care center housed in
the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, exploded without
warning. The explosion resulted in the deaths of 168 individuals-including 19
children-and injury to almost 700 more innocents. Timothy McVeigh and
Terry Nichols, American-born and -raised and bent on retaliating against the
U.S. government for its 1993 siege of the Branch Davidians compound in
Waco, Texas, were separately tried and convicted of the bombing.
8 4
At McVeigh's sentencing hearing, the government put on thirty-eight VIE
witnesses: twenty-six relatives of the deceased; three injured survivors; one
employee of the day care center; and eight rescue and medical workers.8s Over
the course of two full days of testimony, witnesses, very often crying or in
halting voices, provided emotionally gripping and poignant accounts of their
losses. One witness, who miraculously survived the bombing, testified:
I feel like I died, too, on April 19. I feel like my heart looks like that building.
It has a huge hole and that can never be mended.
There is nothing in my life that is the same. I no longer do the same work.
The only thing that is the same is the house that I live in, and now it's a house
that's not a home ....
My father wants his daughter back. He wants me to be the way I was
before.
86
Others spoke of the devastating aftermath of losing a loved one:
It's so hard for me because Karen was my youngest child .... She had not
had a chance to have her babies or have her life ....
[I]t's hard for me to think about a future anymore. And I think about my
84. For discussion of the bombing, see generally MARK S. HAmm, APOCALYPSE IN OLoinMA: WACO
AND Ruv Ru)GE REVENGED (1997). McVeigh was convicted of conspiracy to use weapons of mass
destruction, use of a weapon of mass destruction, destruction by explosives, and first-degree murder;
Nichols was convicted of one count of conspiracy to use a weapon of mass destruction and eight counts
of involuntary manslaughter. A third individual, Michael Fortier, who had prior knowledge of the plan
to bomb the Murrah Building, cooperated with federal authorities in the McVeigh and Nichols
prosecutions and pled guilty to a variety of lesser charges. Jo Thomas, Reduced Term for Witness, N.Y.
TuMEs, May 28, 1998, at AI8.
85. United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166, 1216 (10th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1007
(1999).
86. Trial Transcript at *40, United States v. McVeigh, No. 96-CR-68, 1997 WL 292341 (D. Colo.
1997) [hereinafter McVeigh Transcript].
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future and my family's future, and ... [it's] like a star with one of the points
gone. And it's going to always be that way.
87
More gruesome but no less gripping, rescue workers provided extensive
details of their heroic efforts to remove survivors and locate the dead in the
Murrah Building. A sergeant with the Oklahoma City Police Department told of
his efforts to extricate three adults and two children from the rubble, only
finding one of the adults and one of the children alive, which left him plagued
by nightmares:
I observed a hand and arm to be coming out of the debris and waving back
and forth.
I walked over and attempted to uncover the body connected to the hand. It
appeared to be a female. Her hand was warm. She was clutching my hand ....
I held it as it squeezed, and I could hear muffled moans from behind the
concrete .... I could hear water running in the area; and I screamed to the
other, rescuers that we had to get the water turned off; that I felt she was
drowning.
The rescue worker behind the slab hollered that that wasn't water, Alan, it's
blood ....
[I remained with the victim] [aipproximately three more minutes, and then
her hand got very still and started to get cold. I checked for a pulse and found
none.
88
The sergeant thereafter testified that after leaving the immediate scene, and
heading to the area of the day care center, he was handed a baby with a brick
sticking out of its forehead. 89
The sentencing of Terry Nichols, convicted of conspiracy to bomb the
Murrah Building with McVeigh, made similarly extensive use of VIE. In all,
fifty-five witnesses appeared on behalf of the government. In his opening
remarks, prosecutor Patrick Ryan reminded jurors of the human toll of the
bombing:
Death was random in Oklahoma City on April 19.
... It would be tempting for you to think of this as one mass murder. Don't.
These are 168 people that are all unique. They are all different. They all had
87. Id. at *33-34, 1997 WL 296395.
88. Id. at *32, 1997 WL292341.
89. Id. at *33.
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
families and friends .... They went to church. They coached little league.
They designed highways.
90
Ryan's forecast was soon confirmed on the witness stand.
The mother of a four-year-old child, for instance, recounted that her daughter
pleaded on the day of the bombing: "Mommy .... Please stay home and play
with me. I need you."91 Because she had just started a new job, however, she
resisted and went to work, and the child later accompanied her babysitters to the
Murrah Building.92 "[T]he next time I saw her," the mother tearfully testified,
"was in a box. I buried a little, white box. I never saw her again. And I had to
live with the guilt [] of... being a mother that had to work .... She was taken
from me.",9 3 The bombing, she told jurors, had left her without a future. 94 "'It
was gone!' she shouted, banging her hand down and turning to glare at Mr.
Nichols. 'It was stolen from me!"' 95
Other witnesses testified of the personal traits of their deceased loved ones.
One witness, who had rushed to the building to check on her father, a Secret
Service agent who perished, testified that "[h]e was my dad. And he told me one
time when I had my heart broken, ... 'There will always be one man that will
never break your heart in life, and that'll be me, your daddy.' And my heart is
broken because he's not here."' 96 Another told jurors of how loving her father
was, relating that he had gone so far as to screen her dates by asking to see if
they had a driver's license to verify that they could lawfully drive.9 7 Donald
Ferrell, who lost one of his two daughters, testified of his daughter's extensive
charitable efforts-including work on behalf of battered women-and that she
was active in her church. 98
As in McVeigh, the devastating emotional impact of the bombing also figured
centrally in the government's case during the penalty phase. A father, for
instance, testified how his child was overcome by the loss of his grandfather,
manifested in his chronic behavioral disruptions at school, nightmares, and
voiced desire to die so that he could join him in heaven. 99 Likewise, a man who
lost his mother in the bombing testified of her wonderful qualities and how her
death caused an emotional schism with his two brothers, stating that "[i]t's
90. Trial Transcript at *14, *16, United States v. Nichols, No. 96-CR-68, 1997 WL 790330 (D. Colo.
1997) [hereinafter Nichols Transcript].
91. Id at *29, 1997 WL 796065.
92. Id.; Jo Thomas, Emotion Fills Courtroom as Judge Calls for None, N.Y. TMsaS, Jan. 1, 1998, at
A13.
93. Nichols Transcript, supra note 90, at *29, 1997 WL 796065.
94. Id.
95. Thomas, supra note 92; see Nichols Transcript, supra note 90, at *29, 1997 WL 796065.
96. Nichols Transcript, supra note 90, at *8, 1997 WL 795844.
97. Id. at *45, 1997 WL 793087.
98. Id. at *36.
99. Id. at *16-17.
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divided our family. So I've lost my brothers over this, too."''°
Rescue and medical workers provided grisly accounts similar to those in
McVeigh. One fireman, for instance, noted that five floors of the building had
"pancake[d]" together and the cracks between the floors carried human body
fluids "dripping down on the rescue workers while [they] were in there dig-
ging."' ° The Director of Operations for the office of the Chief Medical
Examiner of Oklahoma testified of the medical and logistical efforts by his staff
to "reassociate" dismembered body parts of victims and the need to inform
survivors that such parts were found, sometimes after formal burial had oc-
curred. 10 2 The collapse of floors of the building "produced a great deal of
destruction as far as dismemberments and crushing amputations and crushed
chests and heads and things like that."'1 3 Among other law enforcement officers
providing grisly accounts, one k-9 officer testified that he had "seen a lot of
blood and brain matter coming down the walls, because there was [sic] people
trapped right above us," and that he had transported from the scene a dead little
boy whose "face was completely gone" and whose "chest cavity was com-
pletely open."' 04 One victim in particular "had a look on his face"-"the impact
of the blast was on his face"-that caused the officer to have nightmares.
10 5
B. UNITED STATES V BIN LADEN
On August 7, 1998, the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya was bombed,
leaving 213 dead and nearly 5,000 wounded.10 6 U.S. authorities eventually
apprehended, tried, and convicted a follower of Osama Bin Laden for the
bombing, twenty-four-year-old Mohamed Rashed Daoud Al-'Owhali, who fled
the vehicle that delivered the truck bomb and survived the blast.'0 7 The United
States employed twenty-six VIE witnesses during the sentencing phase. Prosecu-
tor Patrick Fitzgerald set the stage for the ensuing testimony:
Let me talk to you now about victim impact, which I submit to you is the
most important aggravating factor for you to consider .... You need to
understand the pain, the horror and the agony that the bombing put so many
100. Id. at *24.
101. Id. at *36-38, 1997 WL 796065.
102. Id. at *15, *18-19, 1997 WL 790551.
103. Id. at *16.
104. Id. at *20-21, *23, 1997 WL 796065.
105. Id. at *25.
106. Almost simultaneously, the U.S. Embassy in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania exploded, killing eleven
and wounding dozens. YossEF BODANSKV, BIN LADEN: THE MAN WHO DECLARED WAR ON AmERCA 1
(1999).
107. U.S. authorities arrested and prosecuted three others for the Kenya and Tanzania bombings:
Khalfan Khamis Mohamed, twenty-seven, of Tanzania; Mohammed Sadeek Odeh, thirty-five, of
Jordan; and Wadih El-Hage, forty, a naturalized U.S. citizen born in Lebanon. Id. at 5. In a combined
jury trial, the latter two defendants were convicted of conspiracy and faced maximum terms of life
without parole, while Al-'Owhali and Khalfan Khamis Mohaned were convicted of the actual
bombings and faced death. Id. at 11.
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
people, so many families through. You need to weigh that in the balancing, in
making your reasoned, moral judgment as to the appropriate penalty.10 8
After providing a detailed overview of the suffering wrought by the bombing,
Fitzgerald told jurors:
It's not going to be easy for you to sit there and listen and hear and feel that
pain. That's only natural that you may sit there and say to yourself at some
point, do I really need to hear this? Did I really need to see this? ....
Make no mistake about it, you do .... You're entitled to the most serious
information and you must weigh the pain of that horror that the defendant
Al-'Owhali caused by his bomb in making your decision .... It's the defen-
dant Al-'Owhali who is responsible for that snapshot of horror and pain that
you will see.'
°9
With Fitzgerald seated, the defense, presumably in an effort to inoculate itself
to some degree against the flow of emotional testimony to come, proceeded to
read to the jury the names of the 213 individuals who died in the bombing," 0
and offered that "[tihere will be no evidence presented in this case that anyone
who lost a loved one.., is not suffering. I will not offer any information, nor
does any exist that will lessen that degree of suffering.""'
The ensuing testimony contained a torrent of highly emotional and dramatic
testimony, complemented by videos and photos. The government's first witness,
who lost her husband of twenty-eight years as well as her twenty-year-old son,
read a lengthy written statement highlighting their wonderful personal qualities
and the extraordinary emotional toll their deaths had on her.1 2 Similar testi-
mony by others followed, including from one witness who lost her husband-
whom she described as having "this heart for people, and was so kind, and
considerate .... [A] knight" 3-and learned that she was pregnant when she
returned home from Kenya.' 4 A husband testified at length about his wife,
noting that she "was a very committed member of our village[,] to our clan[,]
and the community as a whole," serving as a volunteer leader in development
and educational projects." 5 Blast survivors told of serious medical hardships
such as blindness and spinal injuries requiring extensive surgery and hospitaliza-
108. Trial Transcript at 6677-78, United States v. Bin Laden, No. S(7) 98CR1023 (S.D.N.Y. May
30, 2001), available at http://cryptome.org/usa-v-ubl-56.htm [hereinafter Bin Laden May 30 Tran-
script].
109. Id. at 6687.
110. Id. at 6692-95.
111. Id. at 6695-96.
112. Id. at 6712-17.
113. Id. at 6756.
114. Id. at 6759.
115. Trial Transcript at 6817-18, United States v. Bin Laden, No. S(7) 98CR1023 (S.D.N.Y. May
31, 2001), available at http://cryptome.org/usa-v-ubl-57.htm [hereinafter Bin Laden May 31 Tran-
script].
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tions in Kenya and abroad, as well as extreme emotional scars impairing their
ability to continue life and work. 116
Medical and rescue workers again provided extensive testimony. One nurse
practitioner, for instance, testified of the scene in the local hospital:
It was maybe three minutes from the explosion.., a sudden wall of broken
bodies began descending from buses and cars ....
Battalions of cleaners kept mops and buckets in full swing to stem the
progressive reddening of our pale green walls and floors. Not people but
crowds, herds even, pushed endlessly through the doors ... leaning, limping,
dragging, and carried in on top of each other with no end in sight, bloody and
bleeding and broken. "17
A doctor who had been stationed in Germany-where victims with the worst
eye injuries were sent-testified to the extensive surgeries performed on the
patients."1
8
C. UNITED STATES V. MOUSSAOUI
On September 11, 2001, four groups of al-Qaeda sympathizers hijacked
commercial airplanes and crashed them into the World Trade Center in New
York City, the Pentagon in Northern Virginia, and rural farmland in Western
Pennsylvania (short of its apparent target, the U.S. Capitol or the White
House). 1 9 Just under 3000 individuals were killed on 9/11,120 and more than
2600 were injured;' 2 1 and, along with billions of dollars in economic harm, 22
the nation's psychic sense of security and safety was extinguished.
123
With the nineteen 9/11 aircraft hijackers killed as a result of their suicidal
assaults, authorities eventually singled out for federal indictment Zacarias Mous-
saoui, a thirty-three-year-old French national of Moroccan ancestry, who at the
time of the hijackings had been in custody in Minnesota on immigration-related
charges. Moussaoui, the government alleged, was a sworn member of al-Qaeda
and had conspired to participate in a mass terrorist assault on U.S. interests by
means of airplanes, and had acted to this end by, among other things, taking
116. See, e.g., Bin Laden May 30 Transcript, supra note 108, at 6721, 6778-79, 6797-98.
117. Id. at 6743-44.
118. Id. at 6787-92.
119. NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ArTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES: THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT
1-14 (2004) [hereinafter 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT].
120. Id. at 311.
121. KENNETH R. FE1NBERG ET AL., FINAL REPORT OF THE SPECIAL MASTER FOR THE SEPTEMBER 11TH
VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND OF 2001, at 96 tbl.1 (2004).
122. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CATASTROPHE INSURANCE RISKS: STATUS OF EFFORTS To SECURrIZE
NATURAL CATASTROPHE AND TERRORISM RISKS 1 (2003) (estimating $80 billion in insured and uninsured
losses).
123. TOM PySZCZYNSKI Er AL., IN THE WAKE OF 9/11: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TERROR 6-7 (2003).
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flight instruction classes.124 Moussaoui, dubbed the "twentieth hijacker," faced
the death penalty on four of the six conspiracy counts charged.
2 5
After extended delays, stemming primarily from his objections to counsel and
quite successful efforts to confound the U.S. justice system with evidentiary and
other demands, Moussaoui eventually pled guilty to six counts of conspiracy.
126
Jurors thereafter found Moussaoui guilty of causing at least one death, as a
result of lying to federal investigators prior to 9/11, rendering him eligible for
the death penalty.
127
In anticipation of presenting its VIE, the government undertook an unprec-
edented effort to create a witness database, consisting -of interviews with more
than 8000 individuals affected by 9/11.128 As a result of this process, "several
hundred" individuals expressed an interest in testifying at Moussaoui's sentenc-
ing hearing,1 29 of which thirty-five ultimately provided VIE to the sentencing
jury.13
0
Much as in the trials just discussed, the government opened with a preview of
its VIE, with Assistant U.S. Attorney David Novak highlighting some of the
most tragic and poignant stories that were to come:
Over the next several days you will hear many, not all, but many voices of
pain and anguish and terror and death .... And you'll hear voices of physical
and emotional suffering, of permanent disability and disfigurement that have
haunted and will haunt for years.
Now, it's one thing for one of us to stand up and to tell you that the
September 11 attacks were horrific and to list for you the number of murder
victims, 2,972, on that day, but the number and the words fail to capture the
enormity and the horror of that crime. That can really only be conveyed by the
voices of the victims and their families.13 1
The government proceeded to call as its first VIE witness former New York
124. Indictment at 1, United States v. Moussaoui, 282 F. Supp. 2d 480 (E.D. Va. 2003), available at
http://www.undoj.gov/ag/mouss2l.htm.
125. Brooke A. Masters, Prosecutors Will Seek Terror Suspect's Death; Man Is Accused of Conspir-
ing with Hijackers, WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 2002, at A4.
126. Stewart M. Powell, Moussaoui Fate Up To Jury; Federal Panel Next Week Will Decide If
AI-Qaida Operative Lives or Dies, TiMEs UNION (Albany, N.Y.), Jan. 29, 2006, at A15.
127. Greg Gordon, Moussaoui a Step Closer to Death, STAR TRm. (Minneapolis, Minn.), Apr. 4,
2006, at IA.
128. Jerry Markon, Moussaoui Trial To Bring Attacks Backfor Jury, WASH. POST, Apr. 6,2006, at A12.
129. See Government's Motion Pursuant to the "Justice for All Act" at 2, United States v. Mous-
saoui, No. 01-455-A (E.D. Va. Dec. 6,2005) [hereinafter "Justice for All Act" Motion].
130. Neil A. Lewis, Moussaoui Given Life Term by Jury over Link to 9/11, N.Y TiMES, May 4,2006, at A5.
131. Trial Transcript at 2883, United States v. Moussaoui, No. 01-455-A (E.D. Va. 2006) [hereinafter
Moussaoui Transcript].
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City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani,' 3 2 who at length vividly recounted the cata-
strophic effects the attacks had on New York City and the heroic efforts of
police, fire, and medical personnel to save and recover the injured and dead 33
When asked about the effect 9/11 had on him personally, the Mayor spoke of his
recurring recollection of seeing two people jump out of the towers holding
hands, later stating that the tragedy "meant the loss of friends I can't re-
place .... [E]very day I think about it, every day some part of it comes back to
me. It can be the person jumping or seeing the body parts... or seeing a little
boy or girl at a funeral."' 134 With voice quaking, and all eyes in the courtroom
focused on him, Giuliani also told jurors about how his long-time administrative
assistant, whose firefighter husband died while rescuing victims, phoned him
about a week after 9/11 to say that she was pregnant. 135 The ex-mayor re-
counted the great joy and sadness he experienced at hearing the news, knowing
that the child would "grow up ... without a very special father."
' 136
Mayor Giuliani's testimony was followed by that of Tamar Rosbrook, who
was staying in a hotel near the Trade Center at the time of impact, and, although
seriously injured herself, captured on video the horrific scene in lower Manhat-
tan.137 Through tearful testimony, and amid what two reporters termed sobs
"uncontrollable and contagious" to those in the courtroom,' 38 Ms. Rosbrook
narrated footage revealing human remains falling from the sky and individuals,
some engulfed in flames, desperately jumping from the buildings in a hopeless
effort to escape. 1
39
In addition to using other video clips, numerous photos of severely charred
human and physical carnage at all three bombing sites, and audiotapes of
horrific 911 calls made by desperate victims trapped within the burning towers
(synchronized with video images of the burning towers),' 4° prosecutors relied
on emotionally searing personal accounts to convey the massive losses experi-
enced that day. The testimony included that from:
132. See Niles Lathem, Giuliani To Face Evil Zac-Witness in Death Case, N.Y. POST, Apr. 6, 2006,
at 3 (referring to Giuliani as "America's Mayor" and calling testimony a "showdown" with the
defendant that promised "to provide one of the most powerful and symbolic moments" of the trial).




137. Id. at 2999-3009.
138. Jerry Markon & Timothy Dwyer, Horror Takes the Stand at the Moussaoui Trial, WASH. POST,
Apr. 7, 2006, at A01.
139. See id.; Moussaoui Transcript, supra note 131, at 2999-3009.
140. In one tape, for instance, a forty-six-year-old father of three, stranded on the 105th floor of the
south tower; frantically pleaded: "'Lady, there's two of us in this office. We're not ready to die but it's
getting bad.' ... 'Oh, please hurry; I've got young kids.' ... 'Oh my God, ohhh."' Neil A. Lewis,
Moussaoui Jury Hears from Grieving Families, and from Victims Themselves, N.Y. Tudm, Apr. 11,
2006, at A16. In another tape, the caller, trapped on the eighty-third floor, cried: "'It's so hot; it's very,
very hot.' ... 'All I see is smoke; I'm going to die.'... "Id.
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" a firefighter, since retired as a result of guilt he felt over surviving the
trauma when so many fellow firefighters did not, who recounted watch-
ing in horror as a colleague was fatally hit by a person who had jumped
from one of the burning buildings;
1 41
" a wife, whose husband died in the attack and whose young son was later
diagnosed with a severe developmental disability, who told of her
struggles to raise her son alone while taking care of other sick family
members and revealed her emotionally devastated son's desire to "be an
astronaut so he can go to space some day to look for his daddy";
142
" a sister, who after frantically searching for her sister without success,
eventually did find her in a hospital, bandaged from head to toe with
ultimately fatal bums so severe that they defied medical classification,
testifying that her parents, who watched their daughter suffer through
fourteen surgeries over forty-one days, were "shells of the people that
they once were";143
" a brother, who told of how his sister became so depressed over the loss
of her husband that she continuously played a phone message the
husband left just before his death and eventually hanged herself from an
exercise machine in her home; 144 and
" a husband, who recounted how the death of his daughter caused his wife
to become a recluse in their home.145
To culminate their case, prosecutors offered the first public airing of the cockpit
recording of the plane that crashed in Pennsylvania on 9/11, revealing the dramatic
struggle of heroic passengers to ward off the hijackers, complemented by a simulta-
neous video indicating its speed and errant path. 46 After introducing a large poster
containing photos of decedents and four large loose leaf volumes containing 408
letters from victims and survivors, the government rested.147
HI. STRAINING THE PARADIGM
As the preceding suggests, VIE in mass killing prosecutions differs in
important ways from that introduced in the more conventional death penalty
cases surveyed earlier. This Part critically examines the points of divergence,
highlighting ways in which common concerns over VIE are mitigated or
141. Moussaoui Transcript, supra note 131, at 3014-32.
142. Id. at 3043-51.
143. Id. at 3149-59.
144. Id. at 3082-99; Phil Hirschkorn, 9/11 Victims Share Heartache with Moussaoui Jury, CNN.coM,
Apr. 7, 2006.
145. Id. at 3066-73.
146. Jury Hears Passengers Take On Hijackers on Doomed Plane, BIRMINGHAM PosT (U.K.), Apr.
13, 2006, at 19.
147. See id.; see also Greg Gordon, Dramatic Note Ends Moussaoui Sentencing, STAR Tm.
(Minneapolis), May 5, 2006, at IA.
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enhanced, and then questions, in light of this distinctiveness, the fundamental
role of VIE in mass killing prosecutions.
A. VIE IN THE VARIED CONTEXTS
By virtue of the massive scale of death and destruction they seek to redress,
mass killing prosecutions could be regarded as sui generis, offering little basis
for comparative analysis. Yet, the prosecutions inextricably remain part of the
criminal justice process,"' with its associated trappings-including VIE-and
thus provide an illuminating basis to explore some of the commonly voiced
criticisms of VIE.
As an initial matter, it might be said that the mass killing context mitigates a
cluster of traditional concerns over VIE. Among these is*that VIE is too
adventitious-that a death sentence should not be permitted to turn on the
happenstance of victims' personal qualities and the loss experienced as a result
of their murder,149 which can be idiosyncratic in nature.' 50 Concern has also
been voiced about the possibility that VIE encourages use of a "comparative
worth" calculus' 51 --in other words, that when provided with information on the
personal traits of victims, the sentencing authority will naturally tend to com-
pare victims' and defendants' relative value and tailor a death decision accord-
ingly. 1 5
2
Such concerns, however, are diminished in the context of mass killing trials.
In actuarial terms, the sheer number of victims logically lessens the adventitious
nature of VIE: with a greater death toll, there naturally comes an increased
likelihood that victims with positive personal traits will perish and that there
148. This point was consciously driven home by prosecutors in Moussaoui, who repeatedly referred
to the events of 9/11 as "murders" and a "crime."
149. For examples of critical commentary to this effect, see generally, for example, Susan Bandes,
Empathy, Narrative, and Victim Impact Statements, 63 U. Cm. L. REv. 361 (1996); Amy K. Phillips,
Note, Thou Shalt Not Kill Any Nice People: The Problem of Victim Impact Statements in Capital
Sentencing, 35 Am. Cpm. L. Rav. 93 (1997); see also Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 506 (1987)
("[Tihere [is no] justification for permitting [the death penalty] decision to turn on the perception that
the victim was a sterling member of the community rather than someone of questionable character.")
(footnote omitted); id. at 505 ("Allowing the jury to rely on [VIE] ... could result in imposing the
death sentence because of factors about which the defendant was unaware, and that were irrelevant to
the decision to kill.").
150. See Logan, supra note 48, at 160-65 (surveying examples such as divorces, familial separa-
tions, heart attacks, and other medical and emotional hardships).
151. For discussion of the role comparative-worth arguments have come to play, see Erin McCamp-
bell, Note, Tipping the Scales: Seeking Death Through Comparative Value Arguments, 63 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 379 (2006). The Payne Court expressly disapproved of victim-victim comparisons in particular.
See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 823 (1991) (stating that VIE "is not offered to encourage"
comparisons between "victims [who] were assets to their community ... [and] victims [who] are
perceived to be less worthy").
152. To Blackstone at least, such a comparison was of no ultimate effect: "[T]he execution of a
needy decrepid [sic] assassin is a poor satisfaction for the murder of a nobleman in the full bloom of his
youth, and full enjoyment of his friends, his honours, and his fortune." 4 WniLtAM BLACKSTONE,
CoMmENrARus *13 (1783).
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will result personal losses of a severe and possibly idiosyncratic nature. 153 The
moral luck of victims and personal losses, a matter of enduring concern to
criminal law theoreticians, 154 is correspondingly less at issue in mass killings
because, presuming the defendant intended the mass targeting, the risk pre-
sented ex ante carries with it a greater deserved culpability. 15 5 Likewise, less
concern exists over the varied capacity of witnesses to convey persuasively such
harms, which raises arbitrariness concerns in conventional trials, 156 insofar as
the exponentially greater number of victims proportionately enhances the ex
ante likelihood of effective witnesses. 157 Finally, the prospects for comparative-
worth assessments are lessened; with the massive degree of human injury and
death, focus on "each victim's uniqueness" 158 is diffused to the point of
abstraction, undercutting possible inclination toward one-to-one compari-
sons. 1
59
These possibilities, however, must be balanced against what are quite clearly
a variety of ways in which VIE in mass killing prosecutions exacerbates
traditional concerns about VIE and presents new, potentially more problematic
ones.
1. Emotionalism
Perhaps foremost, the mass killing context exacerbates the common worry
that VIE undercuts the sought-after reasoned objectivity of capital trials.' 6 In
death penalty proceedings, "emotion [is] everywhere" 16 ' and this pathos was
surely increased by Payne. In the context of mass killing trials, however,
emotionalism is correspondingly increased, which, as Zacarias Moussaoui harshly
153. See United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166, 1221 (10th Cir. 1998) ("[T]he jury could not
have been shocked to learn that some victims had exemplary backgrounds and poignant family
relationships, nor that they left behind grief-stricken loved ones.").
154. See, e.g., MicHAEL MooRE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRAIINAL LAW 191-218
(1997); BERNARD WnLIAMs, MORAL LUCK: PHLOSOPMCAL PAPERS, 1973-1980, at 20-39 (1981).
155. See Stephen J. Morse, Reason, Results, and Criminal Responsibility, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 363,
393-97, 411-12; cf Janice Nadler & Mary R. Rose, Victim Impact Testimony and the Psychology of
Punishment, 88 CoRNELL L. REV. 419, 425 (2003) ("[Pleople view adventitious consequences as less
adventitious when the harm is serious than when the harm is minor.").
156. See Payne, 501 U.S. at 846 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 505-06
(1987).
157. This potential lessening of philosophic concern, however, does not diminish the practical
outcome of the government enjoying an increased pool of persuasive or attractive witnesses upon
which to draw. For further discussion of the significance of this, see infra notes 202-09 and accompany-
ing text.
158. Payne, 501 U.S. at 823 (internal quotation marks omitted).
159. As a technical matter, this prospect is further checked by the requirement in the FDPA that
jurors certify that the race, color, religious beliefs, national origin, and sex of the victim and defendant
did not influence their decisions. See 18 U.S.C. § 3593(f) (2000).
160. See California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[Tfhe sentence
imposed at the penalty stage should reflect a reasoned moral response.. . rather than mere sympathy or
emotion.").
161. Joan W. Howarth, Deciding To Kill: Revealing the Gender in the Task Handed to Capital
Jurors, 1994 Wis. L. REV. 1345, 1396.
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put it in one of his many diatribes, threatens transforming capital trials into a
"Hollywood Deadly Circus."'
162
This heightened emotionalism derives from Payne itself, which allows for
evidence of "specific harm" and requires only that VIE not be "unduly prejudi-
cial" in the context of the proceeding as a whole. 163 Trial and appellate courts,
accustomed to conducting a relativistic assessment that raises or lowers the
threshold of permissible VIE in accord with the destructive extent of the
defendant's acts,' 64 naturally up the ante of permissible VIE in mass killing
prosecutions.
McVeigh illustrates this tendency. The Tenth Circuit, faced with a challenge
over the two full days' worth of highly emotional VIE, during which the
normally stoic Judge Richard Matsch and jurors were frequently reduced to
tears,165 concluded that "[t]he magnitude of the crime cannot be ignored ....
The sheer number of actual victims and the horrific things done to them
necessarily allows for the introduction of a greater amount of victim impact
testimony in order for the government to show the 'harm' caused by the
crime."' 66 The thirty-eight VIE witnesses, the panel emphasized, "comprised an
extremely small percentage of the number of potential witnesses the govern-
ment might have called to testify about the 168 victims who died in the blast
and the impact of the explosion on the numerous injured victims.' 167
Further evidence of what might be called the "McVeigh metric"' 168 is found in
the Al- 'Owhali sentencing hearing. There the following colloquy occurred:
[Defense]: Your Honor, there is not one of us that leaves our humanity at
the door when we come in here, and it is hard to stand up here and play the
grinch in the sense of trying to minimize in a legal sense what cannot be
minimized in the human sense.
The fact is that what we have gotten is witness after witness who tells us
the same thing that we all know, which is that whenever you have someone
162. John Riley, 9/11 Victims' Last Words Played at Trial, NEWSDAY (N.Y), Apr. 11, 2006, available
at http://www.newsday.connewslocal/newyork/ny-usmousO411,0,4056457.story. According to one news
report, on some days of the trial, as many as six of the seventeen jurors or alternates visibly wept during
the presentation of VIE. See Michael J. Sniffen, Moussaoui Jury Shown Gruesome Photos of 9/11
Pentagon Victims, MOBnE REGISTER (Ala.), Apr. 12, 2006, at A6.
163. Payne, 501 U.S. at 825.
164. See Logan, supra note 48, at 185-87.
165. See John Gibeaut, The Last Word: Jury Is Still Out on Effects of Victim Impact Testimony,
A.B.A. J., Sept. 1997, at 42, 43; Peter Gorner, Empathy vs. Impartiality in the Courtroom: Victims
Leave Lasting Impact on the System, Cm. Thim., June 15, 1997, at 1.
166. United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166, 1221 (10th Cir. 1998).
167. Id. at 1216.
168. The concept is not to be confused with what Scott Sundby has referred to as the "McVeigh
factor"-the sentiment, even among individuals inclined to oppose the death penalty, that for some
crimes death is the only justifiable punishment. See Scott E. Sundby, The Death Penalty's Future:
Charting the Crosscurrents of Declining Death Sentences and the McVeigh Factor, 84 TEx. L. REv.
1929, 1958 (2006).
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who dies there is familial loss, which is terrible, and that there are conse-
quences to that that are financial as well .... I understand it is supposed to be
somewhat prejudicial but we have to draw a linesomewhere.
[Court]: What is a fair balance? Two hundred killed and 5,000 injured and
what is the calculus of that?
[Defense]: I don't know, but it is not a mathematical analysis .... It is your
discretion but we have had enough .... I want to weep and stop myself.., it
is a roller coaster and it is enough.
[Court]: I think you have made your point ....
[Gov't]: The only thing I would like to say in response, your Honor, I think
we have made a restrained offering. The number of victims compared to the
witnesses, the witnesses that have spoken have carried themselves with great
dignity and restraint .... They have gone out of their way to fight back
emotion and restrain themselves. I think it is appropriate that another 15 tell
their story to the jury.
[Court]: I agree with the government's characterization of what has oc-
curred here .... There was a time, we all know, when the Supreme Court said
this type of testimony was inadmissible. The Supreme Court in its infinite
wisdom has recognized that that was an erroneous position.
The objection is overruled. 169
In sum, Payne's authorized "'quick glimpse of the life' which [the] defendant
'chose to extinguish""' 170 plainly assumes modified meaning in the context of
mass killings. Because of their toll, courts are inclined to admit correspondingly
more in the way of VIE, unavoidably affecting the emotional tenor of capital
trials and eclipsing the possibility of meaningful due process review.
2. Demarcating the Permissible Bounds of VIE
A second chief area in which mass killing VIE raises greater concern is the
enduringly difficult yet core question of who should be eligible to provide VIE
and the forms of recognized "impact."
With respect to the backgrounds of those qualified to testify, the hydraulic
pressure alluded to above has resulted in the government's having a virtual free
hand in its VIE witness roster. Federal courts, already prone to extend the
permissible pool of witnesses beyond family to include teachers, neighbors,
friends, school classmates, and even co-workers,17 ' have allowed a vast array of
individuals to testify in mass killing trials, including medical rescue workers (at
the site and at distant hospitals), police and fire personnel, and even government
169. Bin Laden May 30 Transcript, supra note 108, at 6808-11.
170. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 822 (1991) (quoting Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 397
(1988) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)).
171. See Logan, supra note 57, at 7, 10 n.54.
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officials (including ex-Mayor Giuliani). 172 Again, neither Payne nor the FDPA
prohibit such an expansive understanding, and the diversity of witnesses, as
John Donne would have it, 173 doubtless suffered harm. 174 However, recognition
of their status as victims risks straining the concept of victimhood beyond
meaningful recognition, with corresponding dilution of its significance.175
Similar breadth is evident on the closely related issue of what qualifies as
"impact." In contrast to Payne, where the VIE solely concerned the emotional
harm suffered by a young boy as a result of the murder of his mother and sister
in his presence, 176 VIE in mass killing cases admits of no discernible limit. 177
172. See, e.g., supra notes 101, 102, 117-18, 132-34 and accompanying text.
173. See 3 JOHN DONNE, No. XVII, DEVOTIONS UPON EMERGENT OCCASIONS (1624), reprinted in THE
WORKS OF JOHN DONNE 493, 575 (John W. Parker ed., 1839) ("No man is an island, entire of itself, every
man is a piece of the continent, a part of the main; ... any man's death diminishes me, because I am
involved in mankind. ); cf. George P. Fletcher, The Place of Victims in the Theory of Retribution, 3
BUFF. CRim. L. REV. 51, 56 (1999) (concluding that "I am afraid there is no easy solution to the problem
of identifying the relevant victim in homicide cases").
174. Terrorist attacks have been characterized as entailing unique "'circles of vulnerability,"'
consisting of four groups of victims radiating in concentric fashion from "survivors." See K. Chase
Stovall-McClough & Marylene Cloitre, Traumatic Reactions to Terrrism: The Individual and Collec-
tive Experience, in PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF CATASTROPHIC DISASTERS: GROUP APPROACHES TO TREAT-
MENT 113, 122-23 (2006). Non-survivor groups include: "[f]irst-degree relatives/loved ones";
"[e]mergency rescue and recovery personnel"; "[s]upport networks (e.g., friends, family, mental health
professionals)"; and "[w]ider sociopolitical community (e.g., government, Americans, New Yorkers)."
Id. at 122 fig.6.1.
175. See CHARLES J. SYKES, A NATION OF VIcrmIs: THE DECAY OF THE AMERICAN CHARACTER 18 (1992)
("If everyone is a victim, then no one is.") (emphasis omitted); James E. Bayley, The Concept of
Victimhood, in To BE A VicrIM: ENCOUNTERS WITH CRIME AND INJUSTICE 53, 58 (Diane Sank & David I.
Caplan eds., 1991) ("When loss sufferers are indiscriminately called victims, meaningful differences
.. are lost, and this loss in turn entails loss of appropriate response .... ).
The tendency is also striking for its asymmetry vis-A-vis other areas of the law. First, as Susan
Bandes helpfully noted when commenting on a prior draft, such a broad understanding of victim status
conflicts with the way tort law often conceives of victimhood, such as in negligent infliction of
emotional distress cases. See also DAN B. DoBs, THE LAW OF TORTS 833-41 (2000) (examining use of
strict plaintiff eligibility criteria, such as the "zone of danger" test); cf. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R.,
162 N.E. 99, 100-01 (N.Y 1928) (Cardozo, J.) (asserting that despite the tortious behavior of the
defendant no duty was owed to the victim; "[t]he risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be
obeyed"). Second, it conflicts with other criminal law contexts where impact is considered but victim
status is quite narrowly drawn. See, e.g., United States v. Terry, 142 F.3d 702, 710-12 (4th Cir. 1998)
(rejecting proposed sentence increase under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines for involuntary manslaughter
conviction because there was "no evidence that the families in question had any relationship to the
offense beyond their relationship to the direct victims.").
176. See supra notes 23-40 and accompanying text.
177. Voicing this concern, Richard Burr, McVeigh's lawyer, in his ultimately unsuccessful effort to
bar VIE from those not losing loved ones, plaintively inquired:
[I]f people who are indirectly affected, even grievously, by an incident, can be allowed to give
victim impact testimony about their condition, where does the line get drawn? For example,
... there has been an epidemiological study done in Oklahoma City to assess the effects of
this on the entire population in the city. [Should this be admitted?]
McVeigh Transcript, supra note 86, at *16, 1997 WL 290019. Faced with the difficult line-drawing
challenge on admissibility, Judge Matsch could only offer as his guiding criteria that "it's kind of a
foreseeability aspect." Id.
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The VIE touched on myriad psychological, emotional, economic, social, and
physical harms, of an immediate and long-term nature, consistent with the
uniquely destructive and destabilizing phenomenon of mass killings.' 78 As one
VIE witness in Moussaoui offered, 9/11 affected "not only ... the persons that
lost loved ones," it also affected "every American []-every American is a
victim,, 1
79
Moreover, VIE in mass killing trials differs in the important sense that it can
concern how state, local, and national governments have been adversely af-
fected. In Moussaoui, for instance, the lead prosecutor offered in his closing that
the VIE was proffered in the name of showing that the "whole nation suf-
fered,"1 80 and jurors were asked to (and unanimously did) find myriad harmful
physical, financial, and operational consequences to New York City and the
U.S. government. 8 '
Permitting the government to claim direct victim status, while again not
without factual basis, is not without consequence. While unusual enough in U.S.
criminal law more generally,1 82 the status transformation is especially problem-
atic in the context of capital trials, where the government seeks to impose its
maximum sanction. As Susan Hirsch, herself a survivor of a terrorist bombing
in Africa, 183 has commented:
Defenders of the death penalty insist that it can be viewed as an act of
retribution-not of vengeance-and thus remain consistent with the concept
of just punishment. Yet the argument becomes strained when the same
178. As noted by Professors Stovall-McClough and Cloitre, mass killings engender unique trauma
for at least two reasons. The first reason stems from the intentional and organized effort they typically
entail-they are "carefully designed to maximize fear and suffering." "This characteristic adds a layer
of malevolence that dramatically increases the sense of violation in victims." Second, they impose
unique "collective" harm:
Terrorism is a shared experience because attacks are most often directed toward groups of
people rather than individuals .... In addition, the particular group of people attacked is often
chosen based upon their symbolic membership in a larger racial, ethnic, or sociopolitical
community. Thus, there is both a direct attack on a set of individuals and an indirect attack on
an entire identified sociopolitical community.
Stovall-McClough & Cloitre, supra note 174, at 119. For more on the unique psychological effects of
terrorism, see generally PSYCHOLOGY OF TERRORSM (Bruce Bonger et al. eds., 2007).
179. Moussaoui Transcript, supra note 131, at 3575. For a discussion of the national psychological
consequences of 9/11, see Roxane Cohen Silver et al., Nationwide Longitudinal Study of Psychological
Responses to September 11, 288 JAMA 1235 (2002); Bradley D. Stein et al., A National Longitudinal
Study of the Psychological Consequences of the September 11, 2001 Terrorist Attacks: Reactions,
Impairment, and Help-Seeking, 67 PsYclEAmY 105 (2004).
180. Phil Hirschkom, Jury Deliberations Begin in 9/11 Trial, CNN.coM, Apr. 24, 2006, available at
http://www.cnn.com2006/LAW/04/24/moussaoui.trial/index.html.
181. See Special Verdict Form for Phase H (Completed), Moussaoui (E.D. Va.) (No. 01-CR-0045),
available at http://notablecases.vaed.uscourts.gov/l:01-cr-00455/docsf72434/0.pdf [hereinafter Special
Verdict Form].
182. See generally MAReus DUBBER, VicrIs IN THE WAR ON CRIME 221-22 (2002).
183. SusAN F. HmscH, IN THE MOMENT OF GREATEST CALAMrrY: TERRORISM, GRIF, AND A VICrIM'S
QUEsT FOR JUSTICE 1 (2006).
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government that prosecutes the crime and carries out the sentence is also
positioned as the target of the attack .... Tempering the power of any
government always poses a challenge but becomes especially difficult when
the state, as a victim, might choose the prerogative that individual victims
sometimes claim when they act on vengeance. 84
3. Witness Harm
Another way in which mass killing VIE accentuates concerns with VIE more
generally relates to its effect on those whose interests it seeks to vindicate-
persons suffering harm at the hands of killers. A prime reason for the popularity
of VIE is that it affords those most directly affected by crime a voice in
punishment decisions, theoretically at once empowering them and providing a
chance for emotional catharsis. 85 Whether these goals should be sought 186 and
are in fact achieved"8 7 in conventional capital trials remains the subject of
considerable debate and controversy.
The unique circumstances of mass killing prosecutions, however, carry an
even greater threat of anti-therapeutic outcomes, as VIE witnesses in Mous-
saoui18 8 and McVeigh18 9 attest. In mass killing trials, the government, pressed to
craft a compelling harm narrative, often resorts to courtroom modus operandi at
odds with the therapeutic needs of victims. As Susan Hirsh has observed:
The state's goals shape victims' stories; the prosecution must keep a victim
focused not on what had the most impact for the victim but what will have the
most impact in convincing a jury to impose the harshest penalty .... [Vic-
tims] are urged to avoid outbursts and asked not to cry. Others are steered by
prosecutors' questions to areas they might not have wanted to speak about,
such as personal emotional trauma, household intimacies, or their financial
circumstances. 1 9
"[T]he penalty phase," Hirsh concludes, "promises agency to victims but
often delivers something quite different.' ' 9 ' This anti-therapeutic climate, in
184. Id. at 251.
185. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 832 (1991) ("'Murder is the ultimate act of depersonaliza-
tion.' It transforms a living person with hopes, dreams, and fears into a corpse, thereby taking away all
that is special and unique about the person. The Constitution does not preclude a State from deciding to
give some of that back." (citation omitted)).
186. See generally Henderson, supra note 46.
187. See Susan Bandes, Reply to Paul Cassell: What We Know About Victim Impact Statements,
1999 UTAH L. REv. 545, 552 (1999); cf. PRimo LEvi, THE DROWNED A.ND THE SAVED 24 (Raymond
Rosenthal trans., Summit Books 1988) (1986) ("[T]he memory of a trauma suffered or inflicted is itself
traumatic because recalling it is painful or at least disturbing.").
188. See Pete Yost, Flight 93 Families Relive 9/11 Nightmare, AssOCLAam PRESs, Apr. 12, 2006.
189. See Jody Lyned Madeira, No Closing 9/11 's Open Wounds, BosToN HERALD, Apr. 8, 2006, at 19.
190. HIRscH, supra note 183, at 182.
191. Id. at 183.
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turn, can be exacerbated if, as in Moussaoui19 2 and McVeigh, 193 victims are
subjected to the public ridicule of unrepentant killers who defiantly scoff at or
mock their hardships in front of millions of onlookers.
19 4
Mass killing trials also impose unique harms by accentuating the personal
differences among victims. Persons suffering criminal harm can and very often
do experience it in varied ways and differ on questions of fundamental impor-
tance, 195 including on whether death should be imposed. 196 With the greater
number of victims there naturally comes a greater prospect for differing senti-
192. See Moussaoui Transcript, supra note 131, at 3664 (testimony of Moussaoui) ("I find it
disgusting that some people will come here to share their grief in order to obtain the death of somebody
else."); Michael J. Sniffen, Moussaoui Gloats During Testimony "No Regret, No Remorse" Trial: 9/11
Conspirator Calls Testimony of Grieving Witnesses "Disgusting," LONG BEACH PRESs-TELEGRAM (Cal.),
Apr. 14, 2006, at A21 (noting that Moussaoui openly mocked VIE witnesses who testified of the
heroism of deceased members of the armed services); see also Neil A. Lewis, Moussaoui, Testifying
Again, Voices Glee Over Witnesses' Accounts of Sept. 11 Grief, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2006, at Al.
Moussaoui's cruelty continued into the actual formal sentencing proceeding itself when he ridiculed
three witnesses for their expressed grief over lost loved ones employed by the federal government. See
Chris Casteel, Victims, Judge Scold Moussaoui in Court, OMAHOMAN, May 5, 2006, at 8A.
193. See Madeira, supra note 189, at 19 (noting McVeigh's dismissive treatment of VIE witnesses).
McVeigh's execution, in turn, provided no solace for survivors, as he remained stoically unrepentant
even when strapped to the execution room gurney and defiantly quoted the poem Invictus. See Pam
Belluck, The McVeigh Execution: The Scene: Calm at Execution Site and Silence by McVeigh Prove
Unsettling for Some, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2001, at A2.
194. Based on interviews with survivors who attended the McVeigh trial (iricluding those who
provided VIE), Jody Madeira concluded:
[A]lthough the criminal justice system successfully held McVeigh accountable through a
conviction and death sentence, it did not effectively mediate the crucial memory work needed
for family members and survivors to come to terms with the bombing. These individuals were
thereby left on their own to cope with McVeigh's defiant response to the horrors he had
unleashed, to reconcile themselves to the unbridgeable gap between an impersonal act of
terrorism and the terrifyingly personal scale of loss with which they had to cope in its
aftermath ....
Jody Lyne6 Madeira, lies Out of Bloodshed: Collective Memory, Cultural Trauma, and the Prosecution
and Execution of Timothy McVeigh ch. 3, pp. 11, 67 (Ind. Univ. Sch. of Law-Bloomington Legal
Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 94, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract= 1005277.
195. Wayne A. Logan, Declaring Life at the Crossroads of Death: Victims'Anti-Death Penalty Views
and Prosecutors' Charging Decisions, 18 Ctm.. JUST. ETHICs 41, 48 (1999) (noting that "there is no
monolithic 'every victim"'); cf. Yael Danieli, The Heterogeneity of Postwar Adaptation in Families of
Holocaust Survivors, in THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES OF THE HOLOCAUST AND OF ITS AFTERMATH 109,
110 (Randolph L. Braham ed., 1988) (noting the varied psychological responses of Holocaust survivors
to their experiences and the attendant varied effects on their families).
196. Cf. JOANNA MAT'rINSON & CATRIONA MIRRLEES-BLACK, RESEARCH DEv. & STATISTCS DIRECrOR-
ATE, HOME OmcE RESEARCH STUIEs, ATrrruDE TO CRIME AND CRnINAL JUSTrCE: FINDINGs FROM THE 1998
BsRTISH CRIME SURvEY 34-44 (2000); see generally RACHEL KING, DON'T KILL IN OuR NAMES: FAMILES
OF MURDER VIcrIMs. SPa OUT AGAINST TH DEATH PENALTY (2003); WOUNDS THAT Do NoT Bm:
VIcrm-BAsED PERSPECTIVES ON a DEATH PENALTY (James R. Acker & David R. Karp eds., 2006)
[hereinafter WOUNDS THAT Do NOT BiND] (reporting survey results showing that crime victims favored
more lenient sentences than would be indicated on the basis of general opinions expressed by
respondents).
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ments on the propriety of capital punishment. 197 In short, while VIE permits a
human face to infuse death penalty litigation, experience has shown that it is
Janus-like.
This split in sentiment can be emotionally harmful in two chief ways: first,
when opponents of capital punishment are precluded from participating as
government witnesses (a common occurrence),1 9 8 and second when proponents
and opponents of a death sentence are pitted against one another (a rarer
occurrence, highlighting the two-edged nature of the personalization sword, but
successfully employed by Moussaoui's defense).1 99 Under such circumstances,
there in effect occurs a high-stakes competition of victimhood,2° ° the negative
consequences of which are compounded by the intense atmospherics of mass
killing prosecutions, with the media reporting with relish survivors' varied
197. Opinion poll data reflect an increasingly broad split on the propriety of the death penalty within
the U.S. population as a whole. In 2005, the Gallup Organization reported that only sixty-four percent
of persons surveyed favored capital punishment, down from a high of eighty percent in 1994. See
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS
ONLINE, at tbl.2.51 (2006), http:lwww.albany.edu/sourcebooklpdf/t2512006.pdf. On the social and
political forces giving rise to this increasing split in public sentiment, see Wayne A. Logan, Casting
New Light on an Old Subject: Death Penalty Abolitionism for a New Millennium, 100 MICH. L., REV.
1336, 1336-40(2002).
198. In McVeigh, for instance, the government refused to allow Marsha Kight to testify, notwithstand-
ing that her daughter perished in the bombing, because she opposed the death penalty. See A
Constitutional Amendment Enacting a Crime Victims'Bill of Rights: Hearing on S.J. Res. 6 Before the
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1997) (statement of Marsha A. Kight). For other similar
instances of marginalization, see Logan, supra note 195, at 44-45.
199. See Lewis, supra note 130, at A5 (noting that the defense presented twenty-four witnesses who
testified of their hardships yet also of their determination to persevere). The defense was permitted to
do so based on its argued need to rebut the avowed representativeness of the government's VIE
witnesses, as permitted by the Federal Death Penalty Act. See Defendant Zacarias Moussaoui's
Response to Government's Motion in Limine Regarding Defendant's Mitigation Evidence at 2, 6,
United States v. Moussaoui, Crim. No. 01-455-A (E.D. Va. Apr. 4, 2006) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c)
(2004)). Avoiding the obvious difficulties presented by the cross-examination of the government's VIE
witnesses on the verity of their losses and the personal traits of decedents, the defense shrewdly
mounted its own witnesses who also had their lives "devastated," yet had been able to "maintain their
equilibrium and go on with their lives." Id. at 6. For additional discussion of this defense strategy,
which was allowed for the first time in Moussaoui, see Adrienne N. Barnes, Reverse Impact Testimony:
A New and Improved Victim Impact Statement, 14 CAP. DEF. J. 245 (2002); Richard Burr, Expanding the
Horizons of Capital Defense: Why Defense Teams Should Be Concerned About Victims and Survivors,
CHANPION, Dec. 2006, at 44, 47.
Consistent with Payne's continued prohibition of witness sentence recommendations, defense wit-
nesses refrained from expressly stating that Moussaoui's life should be spared, but their status as
defense witnesses and subtle linguistic cues allowed their anti-capital views to be readily inferred. See
Timothy Dwyer & Jerry Markon, For Victims' Families, Verdict Elicits Mix of Shock, Relief, WASH.
POST, May 4, 2006, at A16 (noting that witnesses spoke of their recovery and used terms such as
"compassion" and "respect for life"). For discussion of admitted sentence opinion testimony, almost
always in the form of thinly veiled pro-death sentiments offered by government VIE witnesses, and
typically condoned by reviewing courts, see Wayne A. Logan, Opining on Death: Witness Sentence
Recommendations in Capital Trials, 41 B.C. L. REv. 517 (2000).
200. See JOSEPH A. AMATO, VICTIMS AND VALUES: A HISTORY AND A THEORY OF SUFFERING xvii (1990)
(noting that with the ascendant political status of victims "the claims of suffering confuse and divide
us"); cf. Martha Minow, Not Only for Myself: Identity, Politics and Law, 75 OR. L. REv. 647, 650-53
(1996) (offering analysis of the question "Who can speak for whom?" in various legal contexts).
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personal perspectives of whether the defendant should be put to death.2 °1
In addition to driving a wedge between victims, the selection process aggra-
vates relations between victims and the entity theoretically seeking to vindicate
their interests-government. With mass killings, the government necessarily
must choose from among many potential witnesses. In Moussaoui, this pool was
especially large as the government created an unprecedented database of 8000
individuals adversely affected by 9/11 and interviewed each individual who
wished to speak about the impact of 9/11 on their lives.202 As a result of this
process, as noted earlier,20 3 several hundred victims expressed an interest in
testifying at Moussaoui's sentencing hearing,20" obliging the government to ask
the court to invoke a statutorily provided exception to the victims' otherwise
prevailing "right to be reasonably heard at any public proceeding" concerning
sentence.20 5 Pursuant to this exception, the government proposed "45 stories of
victim impact," the "minimum amount of victim impact testimony necessary to
convey the unprecedented level of death and injury caused, '' 2° 6 stating:
[This] represents a reasonable sample ... to convey properly the devastation
caused on that infamous day. The representative sample includes a cross-
section from each of the four flights .... Moreover, the representative sample
includes a diversity in terms of race, religion, economic status and occupation,
and also in terms of relationship to the victim (i.e., spouse, parent, sibling,
child, friend, etc.). The representative sample also includes victims who were
injured, representing the thousands injured during the attacks. 207
The winnowing process of "worthy" witnesses-whether based on the afore-
mentioned representational reasons, or physical appearance, capacity for effec-
tive communication, personal loss, or political favor of the death penalty the
201. See, e.g., Families Divided Over Jury Finding; Moussaoui Faces Death, AssOCIATM PRESS,
Apr. 5, 2006; Sara Rimer, Victims Not of One Voice on Execution of McVeigh, N.Y Tuams, Apr. 25,
2001, at A l (discussing ambivalent opinions among survivors preceding McVeigh's execution).
202. See "Justice for All Act" Motion, supra note 129, at 2.
203. See supra text accompanying notes 128-29.
204. See "Justice for All Act" Motion, supra note 129, at 2.
205. See 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(4), (d) (Supp. IV 2004). Under this exception, when "the number of
crime victims makes it impracticable to accord" all of them the right to participate, the court "shall
fashion a reasonable procedure to give effect to this chapter that does not unduly complicate or prolong
the proceedings." Id. § 3771(d)(2).
206. "Justice for All Act" Motion, supra note 129, at 3.
207. Id. The government added that:
We say approximately 45 victims because some witnesses lost multiple loved ones and they
will testify to impact of the loss of all of their loved ones. Thus, we expect the number of
actual witnesses who testify purely about victim-impact to be less than 45. Moreover, unlike
other murder cases, we intend to have only one witness testify about the impact of the loss of
a single victim.
Id. at 3 n.l.
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government seeks-has the obvious potential to alienate those not selected.2 °8
While the undertaking itself has an avoidable political cast, the high profile
nature of mass killing trials allow politics in an even purer sense to predomi-
nate. This was starkly evidenced in Moussaoui, where to the great dismay of
some victims, 2 ° 9 Rudolph Giuliani, famous former New York City Mayor,
best-selling author of a book entitled Leadership210 (touting his response to
9/11), and then-future presidential candidate, was the government's first VIE
witness.
Yet witness harms do not stem from the litigation process alone; trial
outcomes can also be hurtful. As a result of Payne, capital decisions have
become intensely personalized, with victims' traits and the losses associated
with their killing being offered to justify death sentences. In the mass killing
trials discussed, the affirmative link between VIE and death was readily appar-
ent, with the prosecutor in Moussaoui, for instance, encouraging jurors to not
just affirmatively find the VIE non-statutory aggravator, but to emphasize doing
so with an exclamation point,21' and the prosecutor in Al-'Owhali telling jurors
that the VIE was the "most important aggravating factor" to consider.212 The
life-without-parole sentences ultimately imposed in these and other cases came
as a personal betrayal of VIE witnesses, perversely serving to diminish, in a
most public manner, the memory of victims and the enormous hardship suf-
fered. And, given that VIE witnesses testify in a representational capacity to
secure death, for dozens, hundreds, or thousands of others, a non-death outcome
208. Jody Madeira, in her interviews with victims and survivors of the Oklahoma City bombing,
uncovered a related troubling phenomenon: a hierarchy of harm valuing certain harm sufferers over
others, which created profound tensions among those seeking to heal. According to her research,
hostility existed between families who had loved ones that perished and survivors who suffered
physical or emotional injury, with the former feeling privileged and resentful toward the living. Jody
Lyne6 Madeira, Ties out of Bloodshed: Collective Memory, Cultural Trauma, and the Prosecution and
Execution of Timothy McVeigh ch. 2, pp. 38-41 (Ind. Univ. Sch. of Law-Bloomington Legal Studies
Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 93, 2007), available at http://ssm.com/abstract= 1005274.
Such tensions could naturally be triggered by the VIE witness selection process itself, adding another
possible basis for re-victimization.
209. This dismay stemmed both from the fact that the ex-mayor lost no family members on 9/11 and
that he allegedly pursued policies that exacerbated the harms suffered at the World Trade Centers.
Among the errors highlighted by victims' families included the failure to provide adequate radios to
firefighters and the decision to locate the city's emergency command control center in the Trade Center,
"a known terrorist target." John Riley, 9/11 Widows Rap Rudy's Testimony, NEWSDAY, Apr. 9, 2006, at
A19.
One victim, who lost her husband and who played a central role in lobbying for the creation of the
9/11 Commission, offered: "'I don't understand why he was invited to give a victim impact statement.'
... 'Why Mayor Giuliani? I don't think he needs closure, and he didn't lose loved ones. I think his
judgments caused loved ones to be lost."' Id. Another widow voiced her disfavor even more viscerally:
"'I wanted to vomit.'... 'He spent 31/2 hours talking about the horror of the day, but he didn't mention
the things he failed to do. This is the same story he's been out giving in speeches and getting paid for
.... He should be apologizing instead of getting fees."' Id.
210. RuDoLPiH W. Gu.w~iA, LasDERStIP (2005).
211. See Hirschkorn, supra note 180.
212. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
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risks magnification of witness perceptions of negative self-worth.
4. Tactical Difficulties
Finally, with the greater volume of VIE witnesses and their extensive highly
emotional accounts come correspondingly greater difficulties for defense coun-
sel. As the Payne majority itself noted, given, the high risk of offending jurors,
defense counsel are naturally loath to object to or challenge VIE,213 whether it
relates to the personal traits of victims or the losses associated with their
deaths.214 With mass killing trials, this difficulty is, again, correspondingly
increased. In McVeigh, for instance, fearful that repeated objections would
alienate the jury, and denied a right to review VIE testimony at a preliminary
hearing, the defense team lodged a continuing objection.215 The Tenth Circuit,
however, deemed the objection insufficient, relegating the lion's share of
McVeigh's numerous VIE-related challenges to a stringent (and ultimately
unsuccessful) plain error standard of review. 216
B. THE QUESTIONABLE PLACE OF VIE IN MASS KILLING TRIALS
As the foregoing makes clear, the unique characteristics of mass killing trials
create a constellation of concerns that in many ways casts in new light, if not
transforms, the ongoing debate over the propriety of VIE in capital trials.
However, beyond the practical and doctrinal concerns identified, fundamental
reasons exist to question the role of VIE in mass killing prosecutions in
principle.
First, Payne's avowed need to lend a "human face" to the capital process
would appear especially questionable in the context of mass killings. The
graphic images of 9/11 and Oklahoma City, and the stories of human hardship
suffered as a result of the killings, in particular, were omnipresent and absorbed
by all Americans (indeed, much of the world) at the time.217 If, as the Booth
Court observed, jurors are generally aware of the toll murders take,21 8 and as
Justice Stevens noted in Payne, "[t]he fact that each of us is unique is a
proposition so obvious that it surely requires no evidentiary support',, 21 9 mass
213. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 823 (1991) (noting that "for tactical reasons it might not
be prudent for the defense to rebut victim impact evidence").
214. Nor, realistically, could such losses be challenged. See Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 506
(1987) (noting that "rarely would [defendants] be able to show that the family members have
exaggerated the degree of sleeplessness, depression, or emotional trauma suffered"), overruled by
Payne, 501 U.S. 808.
215. Richard Burr, Litigating with Victim Impact Testimony: The Serendipity That Has Come from
Payne v. Tennessee, 88 CoRNELL L. REV. 517, 525-26 (2003).
216. See United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166, 1218 (10th Cir. 1998).
217. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2760 (2006) (noting that "Americans will
never forget the destruction wrought by" the events of 9/11); State v. Garza, 163 P.3d 1006, 1019 (Ariz.
2007) (describing 9/11 as "an event universally painful for all Americans").
218. Booth, 482 U.S. at 508.
219. Payne, 501 U.S. at 866 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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killing VIE smacks of particular excess. Moreover, any professed need for
heightened humanization, a prime justification of VIE, is undercut by the
sensibilities of the times: Americans are ever cognizant of their common
vulnerability to acts of mass violence 220 and a shared sense of victimhood has
assumed cultural normalcy.
22 1
Second, serious questions exist over whether Payne's core notion-that
victim-specific harm is central to offender culpability-realistically applies to
mass killings; the retributive calculus it implies simply proves too much. How
can it be that anything short of the government's maximum sanction, death, is a
proportionate sanction in light of the high body counts? 222 Similarly, if as Janice
Nadler and Mary Rose assert, harm rightfully plays a heuristic role, providing
"strong evidence of the severity of the crime,', 223 it strains credulity to suggest
that the extent of VIE employed in mass killing trials is needed to convey
culpability. Indeed, there is reason to conclude that VIE, in a perverse and
unintended way, exercises a mitigating influence. While intended to show the
"specific harm" of murder, and not in itself cumulative (no two victims are alike
and losses are diversely experienced), mass killing VIE can have a numbing
effect,224 serving to diminish the desired humanizing force of VIE itself.
Third, how can it be that VIE is needed in mass killing trials to "keep the
balance true ' 225 or to ensure that the government is not deprived of "the full
220. See Joseph Carroll, Americans' Terrorism Worries Five Years After 9/11; Forty-five Percent of
Americans Say They Are at Least Somewhat Worried About Terrorism, GALLUP NEWS SERVICE, Sept. 11,
2006, http://www.gallup.com/pol/24412/Americans-Terrorism-Worries-Five-Years-AfterO911 .aspx (find-
ing that 45% of Americans are at least "'somewhat' [] worried that they or a member of their family
will become a victim of terrorism" and "half say[] a terrorist attack is likely to occur in the United
States during the next several weeks" and noting that there have only been slight changes in these
sentiments over the prior three years); see also MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, UPHEAVALS OF THOUGHT: THE
INrTELLIGENCE OF EMOTIONS 319 (2001) (discussing the empathic pull of "our common vulnerability to
pain"); cf Lawrence Blum, Compassion, in ExPLAmaNo EMOTIONS 507, 511 (Am6lie Oksenberg Rorty
ed., 1980) (identifying as a bond of "shared humanity" the recognition that suffering is "the kind of
thing that could happen to anyone, including oneself insofar as one is a human being").
221. As David Garland has observed, today the victim is a "more representative character, whose
experience is taken to be common and collective, rather than individual and atypical .... Publicized
images of actual victims serve as the personalized, real-life, it-could-be-you metonym for a problem of
security that has become a defining feature of contemporary culture." GARLAND, supra note 46, at 11.
222. Of course, the case can be made that death itself-and for that matter any sanction government
can muster-is an insufficient response to mass killing. As Hannah Arendt wrote of Nazi atrocities, they
"explode ihe limits of the law .... For these crimes, no punishment is severe enough." Letter from
Hannah Arendt to Karl Jaspers (Aug. 17, 1946), in HANNAH ARENDT & KARL JASPERS, CORRESPONDENCE,
1926-1969, at 54 (Lotte Kohler & Hans Saner eds., Robert Kimber & Rita Kimber trans., Harcourt
Brace Jovanovich, Inc. 1992) (1985); see also HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 241 (2d ed.
1998) (averring that we can "neither punish nor forgive" mass killings); MARTHA MINow, BETwEEN
VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE 5 (1998) (asserting
that the legal system is incapable of redressing such harms).
223. Nadler & Rose, supra note 155, at 441.
224. See HIRscH, supra note 183, at 194 (noting that the massive volume of VIE in the Al-'Owhali
trial eventually exercised a fatigue effect-victims' stories became "harder to distinguish from one
another [and the] stories began to sound repetitive").
225. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991).
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moral force" of its evidence,226 given that the defendant has been convicted of a
crime resulting in the deaths of hundreds or thousands of innocents? Indeed, it
is a sobering thought that American jurors (or judges) cannot, without VIE,
achieve "narrative compassion ' 227 sufficient to understand the moral iniquity of
the depraved acts.
Fourth and finally, deployment of VIE in a context so divorced from its
origins can lead to a trivialization of mass killings. As Mark Drumbl has
observed, "it is almost trivially true that the [9/11] attacks were criminal; they
involved murder, injury, hijacking, and property destruction. But describing
them this way literally denudes them of their true nature. ' 228 By focusing on
individualized harms and victim traits, VIE serves to subjectivize mass kill-
ings,22 9 depriving them of their intrinsic universal character. 30 Ironically, by
resorting to a trapping borrowed from traditional criminal justice, in the name of
distinguishing the singularity of mass killing, government may have achieved
the opposite.
In sum, regardless of whether one is persuaded that VIE has a proper place in
conventional capital trials, compelling reasons exist to question its use in mass
killing prosecutions. In making the case for the latter, it should be noted, the
discussion here has not asserted that mass killing VIE is inappropriate because
it in any sense preordains the death penalty. Indeed, the government's record
when it comes to VIE patently precludes any such argument: only McVeigh got
death, with each of the other defendants receiving sentences of life without
parole.23
1
While each outcome can of course possibly be attributed to idiosyncratic
226. Id. at 825.
227. See Yoshino, supra note 43, at 1886-87 (citing and discussing Elaine Scarry, Speech Acts in
Criminal Cases, in LAW's SToluEs: NARArIV AND RHEroaic IN THE LAW 165, 166 (Peter Brooks & Paul
Gewirtz eds., 1996)).
228. Mark A. Drumbl, Victimhood in Our Neighborhood: Terrorist Crime, Taliban Guilt, and the
Asymmetries of the International Legal Order, 81 N.C. L. REv. 1, 67 (2002).
229. See Payne, 501 U.S. at 823, 825 (concluding that VIE is necessary to show a victim's
"'uniqueness as an individual human being"' and to avoid victims being made into "'faceless strang-
er[s]"' (citation omitted)).
230. The 9/11 tragedy itself represents a foremost example. While surely violative of domestic
criminal law, the scale of death and destruction of the events, encompassing victims from eighty-one
countries, and with individuals from thirty-nine countries implicated in the attacks, qualified the attack
as an atrocity of transcendent international consequence. See MARK A. DRUMBL, ArROCrrY, PUNtIsHMEr,
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 4, 132 (2007); cf. KENNE J. CAMPBELL, GENOCmE AND THE GLOBAL VILLAGE 28
(2001) (quoting U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan to the effect that "the crime of genocide against
one people truly is an assault on us all").
231. It bears mention that the evidence on the dispositive influence of VIE in conventional capital
trials remains unclear. See Trina M. Gordon & Stanley L. Brodsky, The Influence of Victim Impact
Statements on Sentencing in Capital Cases, 7 J. FoRENsic PSYCHOL. PRAc. 45, 50 (2007) (finding in an
experiment that only thirty-three percent of the sample subjects found VIE to be "moderately influen-
tial"); Wayne A. Logan, Victims, Survivors, and the Decisions to Seek and Impose Death, in WouNDs
THAT Do NOr BIND, supra note 196, at 161, 173 (citing and discussing studies done to date).
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factors such as the particular jurors impaneled 232 and any number of distinct
features of the respective defendants and trials,233 there is no escaping that VIE
did not compel jurors to automatically impose death. In Nichols, jurors failed to
reach the VIE issue because they could not reach unanimity on whether Nichols
intended to kill, 234 a threshold statutory requirement. 235 In Moussaoui, jurors
unanimously found an extensive array of specific forms of VIE relating to
victims' personal characteristics; emotional, psychological, and physical harm;
as well as adverse consequences to the U.S. government and New York City;
yet did not impose death. 236 Perhaps most significant, in Al-'Owhali nine jurors
expressly found that executing the defendant "may not necessarily alleviate the
victims' or the victims' families' suffering.
' 237
Given the government's unimpressive record with VIE, question naturally
arises over why it has continued to figure so centrally in mass killing trials. As
discussed next, the answer in significant part lies in an array of social and
political benefits extending well beyond the immediate targets of prosecution.
IV. DIDACTICISM AND DISCOURSE: THE INSTRUMENTALITY OF VIE
Criminal trials have always served a variety of critically important purposes.
Most obviously, they signify the sovereign's capacity to impose its authority
over law-breakers, backed by threatened deprivations of life or liberty.238 Yet
232. See, e.g., James Brooke, Nichols's Life Was Saved by a Handful of Holdouts, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
11, 1998, at 14 (noting that the foreperson in Nichols's trial, a natural childbirth instructor, described
herself as a "student of life" during jury selection and burst into tears when asked about the death
penalty).
233. In Nichols and Moussaoui, in particular, jurors were evidently concerned that the defendants
lacked direct participation in the mass killings with which they were charged. See id. (discussing juror
sentiment in Nichols); John Riley, Moussaoui 9/11 Verdict; Jury Spares Life of Conspirator, NEWSDAY
(N.Y.), May 4, 2006, at A3 (discussing juror sentiment in Moussaoui). In Nichols, the foreperson
asserted publicly after the trial that the government "dropped the ball" in not apprehending other
potential suspects in the bombing. See Brooke, supra note 232, at 14. In both Moussaoui and
Al-'Owhali, the possibility of a "terrorist's veto" loomed-that sentencing the ideologically driven
terrorists to death would provide the "martyr's death" they desired, at the hands of the despised U.S.
government no less. in Moussaoui, all jurors expressly rejected as a mitigating factor that the defendant
would be martyred with a death sentence. See Riley, supra; SpecialVerdict Form, supra note 181, at 7.
In Al- 'Owhali, on the other hand, ten of twelve jurors concluded the opposite. Benjamin Weiser, Life for
Terrorist in Embassy Attack, N.Y. TiMEs, June 13, 2001 at Al.
234. See Brooke, supra note 232 (quoting a juror in a post-sentencing interview as saying, "Terry
Nichols wasn't directly present or implicated with anything").
235. 18 U.S.C. § 3591(a)(2) (2000).
236. See generally Special Verdict Form, supra note 181.
237. See Weiser, supra note 233, at Al. This juror information likely affected the litigation strategy
in the subsequent sentencing hearing of Khalfan Mohammed, convicted of bombing the U.S. Embassy
in Tanzania in 1998. With Khalfan, the government focused instead on the capital aggravating factor of
future dangerousness, based on the defendant's alleged brutal attack on a prison guard while awaiting
trial, which resulted in brain damage to the guard. Ultimately, the jury deadlocked and Khalfan also
received a life-without-parole sentence. See Benjamin Weiser, Jury Rejects Death Penalty for Terrorist,
N.Y. TIMEs, July 11, 2001, at B1.
238. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 47-48 (Alan Sheridan
trans., Vintage Books ed. 1979) (1977) ("Besides its immediate victim, the crime attacks the sovereign;
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
criminal trials also fulfill a crucial dramaturgic function, serving as prime
instances of "performing the laws"-allowing matters of common public con-
cern to be enunciated and deliberated before the populace.239 This function
assumes foremost significance in mass killing prosecutions, and VIE plays a
unique role in the political theater that they embody.
In modem times, the phenomenon was most vividly first evidenced in the
Allies' landmark 1945-1946 prosecution of Nazis for atrocities committed
during World War 11.240 The trials (officially called the International Military
Tribunal), held in Nuremberg, Germany, at once sought to hold defendants to
account and create a historical record-in Chief Prosecutor Robert R. Jackson's
words, to "establish incredible events by credible evidence.",241 Didacticism has
played a similarly central role in subsequent mass killing prosecutions, includ-
ing Israel's trial of Nazi Adolf Eichmann in 196 1,242 and more recently, the
International Criminal Tribunals in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia.243
The U.S. domestic mass killing prosecutions examined earlier were also
motivated by a desire to create an enduring public record, and the government
looked to VIE as a prime means to achieve this end. As the lead prosecutor in
Moussaoui told the jury, the VIE afforded an "opportunity to tell a very
important story,",2 4 4 the significance of which should be emphasized by an
exclamation point on the verdict form.245 The Moussaoui trial, however, high-
lighted the much broader didactic function and utility of VIE. More than
historicizing and chronicling the events of 9/11, the VIE in Moussaoui show-
cased its unique instrumental benefits, for government and victims alike.
it attacks him personally, since the law represents the will of the sovereign: it attacks him physically,
since the force of the law is the force of the prince.").
239. See Robert Hariman, Performing the Laws: Popular Trials and Social Knowledge, in POPULAR
TRIALs: RHETOPc, MASS MEDrA, AND THE LAW 17-18 (Robert Hariman ed., 1990); see also Robert
Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 SUP. CT. REv. 305, 385 ("The criminal trial is a 'miracle play' of
government in which we can carry out our inarticulate beliefs about crime and criminals within the
reassuring formal structure of disinterested due process.").
240. In the first trials, conducted 1945-1946, targeting several of the most notorious Nazis, the
tribunal indicted twenty-four individuals, tried twenty-two (one committed suicide and another was
declared mentally incompetent), convicted nineteen (twelve were sentenced to death), and acquitted
three. See TELFORD TAYLOR, FiNAL REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY ON THE NUERNBERG WAR
CRiMEs TRIALs UNDER CONTROL CouNcl LAW No. 10, app. at 241 (photo. reprint 1997) (1949).
241. Report to the President from Justice Robert H. Jackson, Chief of Counsel for the United States
in the Prosecution of Axis War Criminals (June 7, 1945), in 39 AM. J. INT'L L. 178, 184 (Supp. 1945).
On the didactic utility of trials in the wake of mass killings more generally, see MARK OsrEL, MASS
ATRocrrY, CoLLECTIVE MEMORY, AND THE LAW 1-10 (1997).
242. ARENDT, supra note 12, at 19 ("For it was history that, as far as the prosecution was concerned,
stood in the center of the trial.").
243. See, e.g., Molly Moore, Trial of Milosevic Holds Lessons for Iraqi Prosecutors, WASH. POST,
Oct. 18, 2005, at A19.
244. See Jerry Markon et al., Moussaoui Formally Sentenced to Life in Prison, WASH. POST, May 4,
2006, at A 12.
245. Hirschkorn, supra note 180.
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A. BENEFITS FOR GOVERNMENT
For the U.S. government, the tragic events of 9/11 remain a source of
controversy and defensiveness. The bipartisan commission assembled to investi-
gate whether the human and physical harm sustained in New York, Pennsylva-
nia, and Virginia could have been prevented met with significant Executive
Branch resistance,246 and the Commission ultimately highlighted numerous
governmental failures.247 To the minds of some, the United States blundered in
failing to collect sufficient intelligence, make effective use of what it had,
and/or failed to regard the possibility of an attack with sufficient seriousness.248
Meanwhile, conspiracy theorists, including a group of fifty professors calling
themselves "Scholars for 9/11 Truth ' '249 and media interests in the Arab-Muslim
world,250 have questioned whether perhaps the U.S. government was somehow
complicit. 25' In turn, the perception of governmental misfeasance or nonfea-
sance has been fueled, ironically, by the 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund, a
massive federally funded administrative mechanism that has provided "extraor-
dinarily generous" payments to decedents' survivors and persons injured by the
252attacks, permitting parallels to be drawn to prior instances of U.S. largesse in
the face of its alleged failure to protect civilian populations.253
In this context, the government's deployment of VIE in the capital prosecu-
tion of Moussaoui in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
246. The Bush Administration opposed formation of the commission and acceded only after 9/11
victims and survivors signaled that they were prepared to press their case in the media. See Jim Dwyer,
Families Forced a Rare Look at Government Secrecy, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2004, at A18. On the
administration's resistance to the Commission more generally, see THOMAS H. KEAN & LEE H.
HAMILTON, WrrHouT PRECEDENT: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE 9/11 COMMISSION 16-22 (2006).
247. See 9/11 COmMIssION REPORT, supra note 119, at xvi.
248. See, e.g., Dan Eggen & Bill Miller, Bush Was Told of Hijacking Dangers, WASH. POST, May 16,
2002, at AO1.
249. See John Gravois, Professors of Paranoia? Academics Give a Scholarly Stamp to 9/11
Conspiracy Theories, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., June 23, 2006, at A10.
250. See, e.g., Gregory Katz, Arab Press Explores Other Theories in Attacks, DALLAS MORNING
NEws, Nov. 18, 2001, at 17A; Warren Richey, Muslim Opinion Sees Conspiracy, CmuSTIAN Sci.
MONIrrOR, Nov. 6, 2001, at 1.
251. More than a third of Americans surveyed in summer 2006 opined that the federal government
either took part in or permitted the attacks to happen. Jim Dwyer, U.S. Counters 9/11 Theories of
Conspiracy, N.Y. TIMms, Sept. 2, 2006, at B 1. In response, the U.S. government has inaugurated a web
site intended to rebut many of the chief conspiracy theories. See The Top September 11 Conspiracy
Theories, http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p=pubs-english&y=2006&m=August&x=
20060828133846esnamfuaK0.2676355 (last visited Feb. 4, 2008).
252. Kenneth S. Abraham & Kyle D. Logue, The Genie and the Bottle: Collateral Sources Under
the September llth Victim Compensation Fund, 53 DEPAutL L. REv. 591, 592 (2003). Ultimately, the
fund distributed just under $6 billion in survivor claims for 2880 decedents. KENNETH R. FEINBERG,
WHAT Is LIFE WoRTH? THE UNPRECEDENTED EFFORT To COMPENSATE THE VICTIMS OF 9/11 193 (2005). It
also distributed more than $1 billion to 2680 injured victims. Id. The average award for deceased
victims was $2.1 million, and awards to those suffering personal injuries ranged between $500 and $8.6
million. Id at 202.
253. See Michele Landis Dauber, The War of 1812, September 11th, and the Politics of Compensa-
tion, 53 DEPAUL L. REv. 289, 290 (2003) (drawing parallels between the government's compensation of
victims of the War of 1812 and 9/11).
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provided a prime opportunity to recalibrate the critical discourse surrounding
the events of 9/11: to shift from being a target of possible blame and suspicion
to being a sufferer of bellicose terrorist savagery.254 As the U.S. government
opened its coffers to individuals victimized by 9/11,255 it opened its courts to
their stories, and in the process benefited from the patina of their victimhood.25 6
As important, the trial allowed the United States to lay out in extensive detail
the ways in which the federal government itself was victimized that day, asking
jurors to expressly find so on the capital verdict form (which they did),25 7
permitting it to "frame" the events of 9/11258 consistent with its broader war on
terror.
2 59
B. BENEFITS FOR VICTIMS
For victims, VIE afforded similar instrumental benefits. First, it provided a
chance for a fuller depiction of the harms wrought on 9/11, allowing for
augmentation of the 9/11 Commission Report26° and a public airing of the tragic
personal consequences beyond the bureaucratic confines of the 9/11 Victim
Compensation Fund.261 The trial also allowed for discovery of sorts, prompting
254. For an argument that the victims' rights movement more generally has not been driven by a
desire to benefit victims, but rather constitutes a cynical effort by government to commandeer highly
attractive victim imagery and rhetoric to benefit its own tough-on-crime goals, see Aya Gruber, The
Feminist War on Crime, 92 IOWA L. REv. 741, 750, 769-74 (2007).
255. See David W. Chen, After Weighing Value of Lives, 9/11 Fund Completes Its Task, N.Y. TwEs,
June 16, 2004, at Al (reporting that more than five thousand families received compensation from the
U.S. government).
256. See, e.g., Phil Hirschkorn, Jury: Moussaoui Is Eligible for Death, CNN.com, Apr. 5, 2006,
http://www.cnn.com2006/LAW/04/03/moussaoui.verdict/index.htm (quoting Justice Department spokes-
person as the Moussaoui trial entered the sentencing phase that "[o]ur efforts on behalf of the victims of
9/11 will continue as we pursue the next phase of this trial"). VIE held broader instrumental (political)
benefit for the defense as well. In the words of defense counsel, the "reverse" VIE witnesses mounted
by the defense "testified as citizens of a free nation, uncowed by terrorism. None of them.testified for
Moussaoui." Jerry Markon & Timothy Dwyer, Jurors Reject Death Penalty for Moussaoui, WASH. POST,
May 6, 2006, at A01.
257. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
258. See generally ERVING oFtmAN, FRAME ANALYsiS: AN ESSAY ON THE ORGANIZATION OF ExPERIENCE
(1974) (describing how events can be "framed" so as to encourage certain interpretations and discour-
age others). New York City also experienced public history benefit, because it too was sullied over
subsequent charges of ill-preparedness. However, inasmuch as the U.S. government conducted the
prosecution, attention here is dedicated to the didactic role that VIE played vis-t-vis it.
259. As President Bush remarked on the anniversary of 9/11, the events launched a "great struggle
that tests our strength, and even more our resolve," with a new mission to "rid the world of terror."
President's Remarks to the Nation at Ellis Island (Sept. 11, 2002), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2002/09/20020911-3.html; see also Lewis, supra note 130, at Al (quoting President Bush:
"The end of this trial represents the end of [the Moussaoui case] but not an end to the fight against
terror").
260. See Hirschkorn, supra note 256 (quoting wife of victim from Pentagon bombing that "[i]t was
important to all the family members that [the trial] go onto the next phase so the impact statements are
heard").
261. On the central role played by victims in the creation of the 9/11 Commission Report itself, see
Jonathan Simon, Parrhesiastic Accountability: Investigatory Commissions and Executive Power in an
Age of Terror, 114 YALE L.J. 1419, 1451-55 (2005).
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previously unavailable aspects of 9/11 to be publicly aired (for example, the
airplane cockpit voice recordings of the doomed Pennsylvania flight), driving
home again the acts of heroism evident that day.
262
Critically important, moreover, VIE allowed 9/11 victims to reassert their
victimhood, which had experienced a negative status transformation. Having
prevailed in Congress with passage of the Victim Compensation Fund, distinct
both for its unprecedented largesse and the fact that other recent terrorist acts
(for example, Oklahoma City) did not garner a federal compensatory re-
sponse,263 those most directly affected by 9/11 metamorphosed from victims to
recipients; they were, as noted by Michele Dauber, borrowing from the work of
Erving Goffman, "soiled. ', 264 Amid public accusations of money grubbing and
excessive awards,26 5 and disputes among themselves over the relative amounts
bestowed, 266 the beneficiaries of the fund (ninety-seven percent of 9/11 vic-
tims) 267 were "transformed from virtuous to grasping, from deserving of charity
to worthy of suspicion. 268
The extensive VIE provided during Moussaoui's sentencing proceeding-
gripping, highly emotional testimony and exhibits-refocused public attention
away from this unseemly condition and status, allowing for what Henry Louis
Gates has called a "counternarrative. 2 69 Moreover, to the extent that 9/11
victims insisted that monetary compensation did not bring "closure," but only
financial assistance,27 ° public airing of their losses reminded fellow Americans
of their unfulfilled emotional needs, for which VIE held promise but from
which only a small fraction of harm-sufferers were able to benefit.
27 1
In sum, with mass killing prosecutions, VIE affords an array of potential
benefits to government and victims alike. These benefits, however, are not the
most obvious ones. While VIE is touted as beneficial for strategic litigation
advantage in the effort to secure a death sentence and as therapeutic succor for
those taking the stand, evidence in support of the former is manifestly not in the
262. Greg Gordon, Mayhem of Flight 93 Replayed for Jury, STAR TRia. (Minneapolis), Apr. 13,
2006, at IA.
263. See Bill Marsh, Putting a Price on the Priceless: One Life, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2007, at 44.
264. Dauber, supra note 253, at 291, 348 (citing and discussing ERVING GoFFmAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON
THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY (1963)).
265. See, e.g., Lisa Belkin, Just Money, N.Y. TIMES MAO., Dec. 8, 2002, at 92.
266. See, e.g., David W. Chen, Lure of Millions Fuels 9/11 Families' Feuding, N.Y. TIMES, June 17,
2002, at Al.
267. FEINBERG, supra note 252, at 114.
268. Dauber, supra note 253, at 348.
269. HENRY Louis GATES, JR., THIRTEEN WAYS OF LOOIrNG AT A BLACK MAN 106-07 (1997) ("Counter-
narratives are ... the means by which groups contest [the] dominant reality and the fretwork of
assumptions that supports it.").
270. FEINBERG, supra note 252, at 161. Fewer than ninety individuals opted out of the fund and filed
private tort suits. Id. at 164-65. Approximately seven eligible families of decedents failed to seek
recovery altogether. Id. at 161.
271. As discussed above, whether this need was met remains an open and individualized question.
See supra notes 187-94 and accompanying text.
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record,272 and evidence for the latter remains in doubt.27 3 Moreover, as dis-
cussed, compelling practical and principled reasons exist to question use of VIE
in mass killing prosecutions. 274 Nevertheless, equally compelling social and
political reasons make it very likely that U.S. mass killing prosecutions will
continue to be dominated by VIE.
V. POTENTIAL INTERNATIONAL APPLICATIONS OF VIE
As any casual reading of the daily paper will immediately reveal, Americans
are not the sole target of those bent on inflicting mass casualties on innocent
civilian populations. Large-scale murderous acts afflict the world at-large to an
even greater extent, and the international community is struggling over how to
best redress such atrocities. Given this reality, the question arises whether the
hydraulic social and political forces driving use of VIE in U.S. mass killing
prosecutions potentially will, and should, have similar influence in the interna-
tional criminal justice arena.
Today, the victims' rights movement is exercising increasing world-wide influence.
In the multinational context, the United Nations specifies an array of victims' rights in
its Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Wctims of Crime and Abuse of
Power.275 And, in what George Fletcher has characterized as "nothing less than a
major victory for the victims' rights movement, '276 the Rome Statute governing the
International Criminal Court (ICC)--reflecting the influence of the partie civile
approach dominant in continental Europe 277-p reScribeS numerous victim participa-
tory rights.278 Moreover, while not yet expressly condoning admission of victim trait
evidence, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 2 7 9
272. See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
273. See supra notes 187-212 and accompanying text.
274. See supra notes 217-37 and accompanying text.
275. The Declaration provides that victims should have "access to the mechanisms of justice and to
prompt redress ... for the harm they have suffered" and that the "views and concerns of victims
[should] be presented and considered at appropriate stages of the proceedings." Declaration of Basic
Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, G.A. Res. 40/34, Annex N 4, 6(b), U.N.
GAOR, 40th Sess., Supp. No. 53, U.N. Doc. A/40/53 (Nov. 29, 1985).
276. George P. Fletcher, Justice and Fairness in the Protection of Crime Victims, 9 LEwis & CLARK
L. REv. 547, 554 (2005).
277. Gerard J. Mekjian & Matthew C. Varughese, Hearing the Victim's Voice: Analysis of Victims'
Advocate Participation in the Trial Proceedings of the International Criminal Court, 17 PACE INT'L L.
REv. 1, 16-17 (2005) ("Civilist legal systems [] allow a victim to act as partie civile [where] a victim is
afforded the capacity to directly through their counsels, or indirectly, through the prosecution, present
evidence in a criminal proceeding which the victim deems necessary for the subsequent pursuit of
damages in civil proceedings.").
278. See generally id. Victims figure centrally in ad hoc tribunals as well. See generally, e.g., David
Boyle, The Rights of Victims: Participation, Representation, Protection, Reparation, 4 J. INT'L CIUM.
JUST. 307 (2006) (discussing the significant role of victims in the Cambodian Extraordinary Chambers,
based on Cambodian law with its partie civile orientation).
279. For a comprehensive summary of case law rendered by the ICTY, with particular focus on such
testimony, see HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, GENOCIDE, WAR CRIMEs AND CRiMEs AGAINST HuMAierrY: A ToPicAL
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and the ICC2 ° both allow for victim harms to be considered in assessing punishment.
While significant, these steps have nonetheless been uneven and tentative. In
the ICC context, for instance, core legal concepts-such as whether "victim"
status also encompasses third parties suffering indirect harm-have yet to be
clarified.28' Moreover, the ICC makes victim input a matter of discretion for the
court and emphasizes that such input "will in most cases take place through a
legal representative and will be conducted in a manner which is not prejudicial
or inconsistent with the rights of the accused and a fair and impartial trial."
2 8 2
A. PROSPECTS FOR MIGRATION
Despite this tentativeness, and despite the ongoing pressure to limit criminal
tribunal proceedings due to their cost and extended duration,283 the distinct
possibility exists that VIE will migrate into the international arena in coming
years. This is so for several reasons. First and foremost, as in the United States,
affording victims a direct role in the prosecution and punishment of their
oppressors enjoys enormous social, political, and (some would assert) moral
appeal.284 This appeal is amplified in the context of mass killings, given their
grave harms and exponentially greater number of victims.
28 5
A second reason supporting the migration of VIE stems from the doctrinal
void presently characterizing international criminal law. As Mark Drumbl re-
cently observed, "the international community is prosecuting crimes of mass
DIGEST OF THE CASE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YuOosLAViA 554-55,
562-64, 605-06 (2006).
280. See I.C.C. R.P. & EvlD. 145(1)(c), available at http://www.icc-cpi.intllibrary/aboutofficialjournal
Rules_of_procedureandEvidenceEnglish.pdf (specifying that "the harm caused to victims and their
families" is to be considered in determining sentences).
281. See Carsten Stalin et al., Participation of Victims in Pre-Trial Proceedings of the ICC, 4 J. Ir'L
CRIM. JUST. 219, 231-33 (2006) (noting this lack of clarification and urging a broad definition that
encompasses both direct and indirect victims, based on ICC Rules).
282. See Int'l Criminal Court, Victims and Witnesses, http://www.icc-cpi.int/victimsissues.html (last
visited Oct. 16, 2007) (quotation marks omitted).
283. See Nancy Combs, Procuring Guilty Pleas for International Crimes: The Limited Influence of
Sentence Discounts, 59 VAND. L. REv. 69, 84-86 (2006) (noting severe budgetary pressures on
tribunals); Mugambi Jouet, Reconciling the Conflicting Rights of Victims and Defendants at the
International Criminal Court, 26 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 249, 299 (2007) (noting lengthy duration of
trials before the Rwandan and Yugoslavian International Criminal Tribunals).
284. See, e.g., Stahn et al., supra note 281, at 221 ("On a moral level, the participation of victims
will ensure that the Court, and the international community at large, are made fully aware of the
suffering endured by victims.").
285. This is so regardless of whether the death penalty looms as potential punishment. In the United
States, of course, federal law permits the death penalty, which was sought in each of the prosecutions
surveyed above. While international tribunals do not now permit capital punishment, domestic criminal
law in several countries in which mass killings have occurred does permit the sanction, and capital
prosecutions have ensued in those countries. See Jens David Ohlin, Applying the Death Penalty to
Crimes of Genocide, 99 Am. J. IN'L L. 747, 755-56 (2005) (discussing the availability of the death
penalty in Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia, and Iraq). When death is a possible sanction, the personal
stakes for defendants are higher, but the systemic and juristic ramifications discussed here pertain even
when a lesser sanction looms.
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violence without first having developed a thorough criminology of mass vio-
lence, penology for perpetrators, or a victimology for those aggrieved. 286
Sentencing, in particular, however, has of late deservedly received increased
287attention, complemented by calls for more reasoned analysis in support of
sentences2 88 and distinct sentencing proceedings like those used in the United
States,289 the system that inspired Payne. Indicative of this increased formaliza-
tion, tribunals have identified and relied upon aggravating and mitigating
circumstances (including VIE-like considerations) for consideration in reaching
outcomes. 290 As this transformation continues, the increasing tendency of inter-
national tribunals to attach cardinal importance to the "gravity" of an offense,
291
as the Payne majority did in 1991, makes the migration all the more likely.
B. BACK TO THE FUTURE: NUREMBERG, EICHMANN, AND MODERN DAY ATROCITIES
In setting the contours for any discussion of the propriety of such a migration,
one cannot avoid the foundational legacy afforded by the prosecution of Nazis
in the wake of World War II, events that continue to exercise singular influence
on legal internationalism. 292 Indeed, the Nuremberg trials of 1945 mounted by
the Allies,293 and the prosecution of Adolf Eichmann by the Israeli government
in 1961,294 although historically unique, helpfully serve to frame and illuminate
the competing legal visions that should inform any such debate.
286. Mark A. Drumbl, Collective Violence and Individual Punishment: The Criminality of Mass
Atrocity, 99 Nw. U. L. REv. 539, 576 (2005); see also Alison Marston Danner, Constructing a
Hierarchy of Crimes in International Criminal Sentencing, 87 VA. L. REv. 415, 434 & n.81 (2001)
(noting historical inattention in international fora to sentencing principles and goals in particular).
287. See, e.g., Robert D. Sloane, Sentencing for the "Crime of Crimes": The Evolving "Common
Law" of Sentencing of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwand, 5 J. INT'L CIuM. JUST. 713 (2007)
(discussing the development of "common law"-style sentencing guidelines for the crime of genocide).
288. See, e.g., Danner, supra note 286, at 418, 434.
289. See generally, e.g., Stuart Beresford, Unshackling the Paper Tiger-The Sentencing Practices
of the Ad Hoc Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, 1 INT'L CiuM. L. REV. 33
(2001).
290. See supra notes 278-80 and accompanying text.
291. See, e.g., Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 78, §1, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90, available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/romefra.htm; Prosecutor v. Stakic, Case No.
IT-97-24-A, Judgment, 357 (Mar. 22, 2006); Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33, Judgment, 11
698-703 (Aug. 2, 2001). See generally Andrea Carcano, Sentencing and the Gravity of the Offense in
the International Criminal Court, 51 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 583 (2000); Ralph Henham, Developing
Contextualized Rationales for Sentencing in International Criminal Tiials, 5 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 757,
759 (2007); Ray Murphy, Gravity Issues and the International Criminal Court, 17 CRIM. L.F. 281
(2006).
292. See Richard Overy, The Nuremberg Trials: International Law in the Making, in FROM NUREM-
BERG TO Ti HAGUE: Tim FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL CIMIAL JUsTICE 2, 28-29 (Phillipe Sands ed., 2003)
(noting critical influence of Nuremberg for contemporary international criminal justice); Alan A. Ryan,
Nuremberg's Contributions to International Law, 30 B.C. INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 55 (2007) (same).
293. For examples of the expansive Nuremberg historiography see generally, for example, DONALD
BLoxii, GENOCIDE ON TRIAL. WAR CRIMES AN Ts D HE FORMATION OF HOLOCAUST HISTORY AND
MEMORY (2001), and ANN TuSA & JOHN ThSA, Tim NUREMBERG TRIALS (2003).
294. Eichmann, who oversaw the transport of Jews to concentration camps, was captured in
Argentina by Israeli intelligence agents and tried in a capital proceeding shortly thereafter in Israel by a
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The proceedings at Nuremberg, occurring while Europe was still reeling from
the unprecedented carnage and savagery of the war, were driven by the Allies'
intense desire to impress upon the emerging new world order the virtue of their
cause. 295 This foremost goal influenced the tactical approach taken by the
prosecution, motivating it to establish Nazi atrocities first and foremost by
means of documentation, rather than live witnesses.29 6 Chief Prosecutor Robert
Jackson, writing several years after the trials, recounted the pivotal choice
made:
The prosecution early was confronted with two vital decisions .... One was
whether chiefly to rely upon living witnesses or upon documents for proof of
our case. The decision ... was to use and rest on documentary evidence to
prove every point possible .... The documents could not be accused of
partiality, forgetfulness, or invention, and would make the sounder founda-
tion, not only for the immediate guidance of the Tribunal, but for the ultimate
verdict of history.29 7
In Eichmann, on the other hand, victims and their plight played a self-
consciously central role. Chief Prosecutor Gideon Hausner, Israel's Attorney
General, accentuated this role at the outset of the trial, when he stated in
opening argument:
As I stand here before you, Judges of Israel, to lead the prosecution of Adolf
Eichmann, I do not stand alone. With me, in this place and at this hour, stand
six million accusers. But they cannot rise to their feet and point an accusing
finger toward the man who sits in the glass dock and cry: "I accuse." For their
ashes were piled up in the hills of Auschwitz and in the fields of Treblinka
.... Their blood cries out, but their voices are not heard.298
In the ensuing proceedings, conducted in a municipal auditorium in Jerusa-
lem remodeled for the trial, one hundred witnesses provided dramatic accounts
three-judge panel. See generally Zvi AHARoNi & WmHELM DmTL, OPERATION EICHMANN: THE TRUTH
ABOUT THE PuRsurr, CAPTURE AND TRIAL (1997).
295. See GARY JONATHAN BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE: THE POLTICS OF WAR CRIMES
TRIBuNALS 24 (2000) (noting U.S. efforts to foster extension of procedural rights in prosecutions of Nazi
defendants); PETER MAGUIRE, LAW AND WAR: AN AMERICAN STORY 91 (2001) (observing that U.S.
Secretary of War Henry Stinson argued for a tribunal such as Nuremberg because it would provide a
public chronicle and highlight to the world the differences between the defeated fascist and totalitarian
regimes and the democratic values of the Allies).
296. LAWRENCE DOUGLAS, THE MEMORY OF JUDGMENT; MAKING LAW AND HISTORY IN THE TRIALS OF THE
HOLOCAUST 12 (2001) (noting that roughly 4000 German documents and 1800 still photos were entered
as exhibits).
297. Robert H. Jackson, Introduction to WHIrNEY R. HARRIS, TYRANNY ON TRIAL Xxix, XXXV-XXXVi
(1954); see also Telford Taylor, The Nuremberg War Crimes Trials, 27 INT'L CONCLIATION 243, 262
(1949) (noting that "the judicial foundations of the trial were strengthened" by its emotionally
unadorned legalism).
298. GIDEON HAUSNER, JUSTICE IN JERUSALEM 323-24 (1966).
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of their plight and that of their deceased loved ones.299 Hausner subsequently
wrote that the prosecution was grateful for the "documentation sessions, ''3 °° yet
that the "narratives were so overwhelming, so shocking, that we almost stopped
observing the witnesses and their individual mannerisms. 3 °1
It was often excruciating merely to listen to one of these tales. Sometimes
we felt as if our reactions were paralyzed, and we were benumbed. It was a
story with an unending climax. Often I heard loud sobbing behind me in the
courtroom. Sometimes there was a commotion, when the ushers removed a
listener who had fainted. Newspaper reporters would rush out after an hour or
two, explaining that they could not take it without a pause.
302
The prosecution's modus operandi, in turn, was geared toward achieving
maximum victim-centeredness and pathos. Hausner's prosecution team, like the
U.S. prosecutors in Moussaoui,30 3 undertook a massive effort to identify poten-
tial witnesses, and hand-picked from the hundreds of applicants those who
ultimately testified.30 4 Likewise, as in Moussaoui where Mayor Giuliani was
designated as the first VIE witness to testify, the Israeli government selected
witnesses of public prominence to convey the victim narrative, as well as
individuals capable of telling a "good story., 30 5 Hausner, like his U.S. prosecuto-
rial counterparts, urged the court to "remember the faces and the reactions of
those survivors who testified here.
30 6
In sum, while both the Nuremberg and Eichmann trials sought to chronicle
the horrors of Nazism, they went about doing so in very different ways.
Whereas in Nuremberg government officials steadfastly focused on the aggres-
sive war-making of the defendants, largely divorced from their individualized
human effects,30 7 and the didactic idiom was documentary,30 8 in Eichmann the
299. See ARnDr, supra note 12, at 223.
300. HAusNER, supra note 298, at 331.
301. Id. at 327.
302. Id. at 331; see also id. at 291 (noting that, in contrast to the Nuremburg tribunal, the testimony
at Eichmann's trial was intended to "reach the hearts of men"); TOM SEGEV, THE SEVENTH MILLION: THE
IsRAELIs AND THE HOLOCAUST 337-39 (1993) (noting that the witness testimonials, unlike the documents
at Nuremburg, were intended by Hausner to "shock the heart").
303. See supra notes 202-05 and accompanying text.
304. See ARENDT, supra note 12, at 223; HAusNER, supra note 298, at 292-97.
305. See Hanna Yablonka, Preparing the Eichmann Trial: Who Really Did the Job?, 1 THEORETIcAL
INQUIRIES L. 369, 379-83 (2000). On the political cast of such prosecutions more generally see
Christopher Rudolph, Constructing an Atrocities Regime: The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals, 55
INT'L ORG. 655 (2001).
306. DOUGLAS, supra note 296, at 176. Likewise, as in the U.S. trials surveyed, Eichmann's counsel
studiously refrained from cross-examining any victim-witnesses, "out of respect and reverence for their
suffering." Id. at 129.
307. Id. at 93-94 (observing that the primary evidentiary emphasis at trial was on Nazis' aggressive
war-making, not the plight of victims).
308. Id. at 104 (noting that the Nuremberg trial strategy was largely "documentary--conceived
either as filmic, material, or written artifact").
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prosecution focused squarely and unremittingly on the plight of victims. Rather
than eschewing pathos and victim-centeredness out of concern that the legal
integrity of the forum would be subverted and hence subject to dispute, a prime
concern in Nuremberg, Eichmann immersed itself in it.30 9 As noted by Shos-
hana Felman, "[w]hereas the Nuremberg trials view murderous political re-
gimes and their aggressive warfare as the center of the trial..., the Eichmann
trial views the victims as the center of what gives history its monumental
dimensions and what endows the trial with its monumental significance. '10
The tenor and content of the Eichmann prosecution inspired pointed criticism
from Hannah Arendt who covered the trial for the New Yorker magazine,31' and
famously coined the term "banality of evil" in her book on the proceedings.
312
To her, the trial amounted to an improper invasion of the public by the private,
diminishing the juridical stature of the enterprise.31 3 Writing in terms evocative
of criticisms leveled against VIE today, Arendt wrote:
For just as a murderer is prosecuted because he has violated the law of the
community, and not because he has deprived the Smith family of its husband,
father and breadwinner, so these modem, state-employed murderers must be
prosecuted because they violated the order of mankind, and not because they
killed millions of people. 314
Likewise, she condemned what she saw as the over-the-top historicism of the
trial, obviated by the reality (similar to the U.S. domestic trials discussed
earlier) that the audience "was filled with 'survivors,' ... immigrants from
Europe, like myself, who knew by heart all there was to know. ' 31 5 To Arendt,
the prosecution's case was objectionable because it "was built on what the Jews
had suffered, not on what Eichmann had done. 31 6 The trial, she wrote, "degen-
309. Chief Prosecutor Hausner insisted that the use of live witnesses would convey the human harm
in a fashion that "incomprehensible statistics" could not. HAUSNER, supra note 298, at 291-92; see also
DOUGLAS, supra note 296, at 106-09 (describing emotional nature of Eichmann proceedings).
310. Shoshana Felman, Theaters of Justice: Arendt in Jerusalem, the Eichmann Trial, and the
Redefinition of Legal Meaning in the Wake of the Holocaust, 1 TNEoRmcAL INQUIRIES L. 465, 479
(2000).
311. The New Yorker website has abstracts of all five of Hannah Arendt's New Yorker articles
between February and March of 1963. See, e.g., Hannah Arendt, V-Eichmann in Jerusalem, NEW
YORKER, Mar. 16, 1963, at 58, available at http://www.newyorker.com/archive/1963/03/16/
1963_03_16_058_TNYCARDS_000272118 (abstract only).
312. ARENDT, supra note 12.
313. See id. at 253 ("The purpose of a trial is to render justice, and nothing else; even the noblest of
ulterior purposes ... can only detract from the law's main business: to weigh the charges brought
against the accused, to render judgment, and to mete out due punishment.").
314. Id. at 272; cf Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 505-07 (1987) (condemning VIE because it
distracts the sentencing authority from the character of the defendant and the circumstances of the
crime, the traditional retributive bases of the death penalty inquiry).
315. ARENOT, supra note 12, at 8. In addition to the courtroom, Eichmann was witnessed by a
television audience, which in Israel, at least, was acutely aware of the savagery of the Nazi regime.
JEFFREY SHANDLER, WHILE AMERICA WATCHES: "[1LEVISING THE HOLOCAUST (1999).
316. See ARENDT, supra note 12, at 6.
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erate[d] into a bloody show," wherein "witness followed witness and horror was
piled upon horror.,
3 17
To others, however, such as Professor Shoshana Felman, it is precisely this
intensely personalized quality that enables the chronicling of mass killing to be
part of, in Nietzsche's terms, "monumental history., 318 Eichmann amounted to a
"revolutionary transformation of the victim that ma[de] the victim's story
happen for the first time" and permitted "a legal act of authorship of history. 319
While Nuremberg created enduring legal precedent, for the first time holding
individuals accountable for crimes against humanity,32 ° its "legal narrative[ ]
did not suffice, since it did not articulate the victims' story, but subsumed it in
the general and political and military story of the War.",321 Eichmann's prosecu-
tion was transformative, Felman contends, not so much for its advancement of
victims' rights, but rather because it allowed for "victims' (legal and historical)
authority.', 322 Eichmann, in short, for the first time allowed conveyance of a
"monumental history' not of the victors but of the victims,,,32 3 endowing the
dramatic with legal meaning and vice versa.324
C. THE PERILS OF VICTIM-CENTEREDNESS
Whether lending a human face to atrocity diminishes the gravity and quality
of legal proceedings intended to redress mass killings remains a central question
for international criminal justice. Given the intractably political nature of such
prosecutions, one's perspective on the question must ultimately turn on the
degree (not whether) such interests-embodied here in the pathos of victim
317. Id. at 8-9; see also Susan Sontag, Reflections on The Deputy, in THE STORM ovER THE DEPUTY
117, 118-19 (Eric Bentley ed., 1964) (writing that "[t]he function of [Eichmann] was [] that of the
tragic drama: above and beyond judgment and punishment .... [T]he problem of the Eichmann trial
was not its deficient legality, but the contradiction between its juridical form and its dramatic
function"); cf IAN BURMA, THE WAGES OF GUILT: MEMORIES OF WAR IN GERMANY AND JAPAN 142 (1994)
("When the court of law is used for history lessons, then the risk of show trials cannot be far off.").
318. FRIEDRICH NmruzscHE, TaE USE AND ABUSE OF HISTORY 13 (Adrian Collins trans., Bobbs-Merril
Co. 2d ed. 1957) (1874).
319. Felman, supra note 310, at 498 (emphases omitted); see also DOUGLAS, supra note 296, at 94
(not until Eichmann would victims "be permitted to be heard in court as fully embodied").
320. Cf FROM NUREMBERG TO THE HAGUE: THE FUtURE OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 28
(Phillipe Sands ed., 2003) (noting that "[t]he precise nature of the crimes associated with the war had to
be defined and given clear legal status" and that the Nuremberg trials helped "build[] the foundation for
contemporary international law on war crimes").
321. Felman, supra note 310, at 504.
322. Id. at 504 n.66 (emphasis omitted); see also id. ("In the act of claiming their humanity, their
history, their story, and their voice before the law and the world, they are actively (and sovereignly)
reborn from a kind of social death into a new life.").
323. Shoshana Felman, A Ghost in the House of Justice: Death and the Language of the Law, 13
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 241, 249 (2001).
324. See id. at 277. A similar victim-centeredness dominated the 1997-1998 trial of Maurice Papon
by the French government for World War H-era atrocities in Vichy France. See Nancy Wood, The
Papon Trial in an "Era of Testimony," in THE PAPoN AFFAIR: MEMORY AND JUSTICE ON TRIAL 96, 96-105
(Richard J. Golsan ed., 2000).
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narrative-should infuse the legal process.325
In the United States, Payne signaled a resolute backing of this infusion,
positing that harm, embodied in the personal traits of decedents and the losses
stemming from their murder, is key to assessing offense gravity and defendant
culpability, and that the "moral force" of such evidence is such that direct
testimony should be permitted.326 Victim harm and the pathos it inevitably
entails and engenders, to this way of thinking, are not irrelevant and extraneous
to law and history-making; rather, they are central and critically important.
This view, however problematic in conventional murder trials, is complicated
in the context of mass killings. As discussed, their fundamentally different
character at once exacerbates acknowledged difficulties of VIE 3 2 7 and calls into
question the fundamental place of VIE in such prosecutions. 328 But adoption by
the international justice community of VIE, a recent (and controversial) innova-
tion of United States domestic criminal law, is problematic on a number of other
levels as well.329
Most fundamentally, serious question exists over whether the values embod-
ied in VIE jibe with all or even a significant part of the international justice
community.330 While the views of nations and cultures can coalesce on matters
of broad importance (for example, the principle of nulla poena sine or the moral
wrongfulness of murder), they often diverge on questions relating to more
specific normative notions of substantive and procedural fairness.33' Consistent
with this awareness, increasing expressivist concern is today being voiced over
the perception (and possibly the actuality) of unfairness of international crimi-
nal tribunals, 332 lending support to Robert Jackson's prescient observation that
325. As Robert Cover famously noted, the legal tradition encompasses "not only a corpus juris, but
also a language and a mythos-narratives in which the corpus juris is located by those whose wills act
upon it." ROBERT CovER, Nomos and Narrative, in NARRATIvE, VIOLENCE, AND THE LAW 95, 101 (Martha
Minow et al. eds., 1992).
326. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 826-27 (1991).
327. See supra notes 160-216 and accompanying text.
328. See supra notes 217-37 and accompanying text.
329. See Steven R. Ratner, The Schizophrenias of International Criminal Law, 33 TEx. INr'L L.J.
237, 251 (1998) (commenting that the "mechanical transfer of domestic criminal law principles to the
international context ... is fraught with dangers"); Immi Tallgren, The Sensibility and Sense of
International Criminal Law, 13 EuR. J. INT'L L. 561, 565-66 (2002).
330. Needless to say, constituent parts of the world community do not necessarily share a normative
preference for victim-centeredness, embracing instead the traditional norm that killings should be
punished to vindicate broader societal and communal, not individual, interests. On the varied penologi-
cal sentiments among various world subpopulations more generally, see DRUMBL, supra note 230, at
42-43, 135, 148; Miriam. J. Aukerman, Extraordinary Evil, Ordinary Crime: A Framework for
Understanding Transitional Justice, 15 HARv. HuM. RTs. J. 39, 92-94 (2002).
331. For discussion of the pervasive influence of the West vis-k-vis international justice norms and
practices, often at odds with local norms and preferences, see generally RAMA MAi, BEYOND RETRIBU-
TION: SEEKING JUSTICE IN THE SHADOWS OF WAR 47-49 (2002) (arguing that the greatest hurdle to
transnational justice is the "predominance of Western-generated theories and the absence of non-
Western philosophical discourse").
332. See, e.g., Diane Marie Amann, Group Mentality, Expressivism, and Genocide, 2 lNr'L C, IM. L.
REV. 93, 132-33 (2002) (asserting that "[olveremphasis on conveying condemnation will transform
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"[c]ourts try cases, but cases also try courts. 33 3
Accordingly, to the extent that the international justice community seeks to
win the hearts and minds of individuals prone to conceive of VIE as degrading
the legitimacy of the legal process-in Moussaoui's words, creating a maudlin
"Hollywood Deadly Circus"334 -its task is made considerably more difficult
with its admission. Such concern surely warrants attention on the figurative
international stage as the tribunals struggle to achieve and maintain respect.
Almost as important, however, is how VIE might play in the domestic realm,
where internecine ethnic and political disputes in conflict-ravaged countries so
often still simmer. With its highly personalized quality, VIE risks fueling
perceptions of bias and uneven enforcement that continue to dominate local
regard for international prosecutions, serving to exacerbate already substantial
obstacles to heal societies plagued by mass killings.335
Sensitivity to social meaning, however, is not warranted solely vis-A-vis
law-abiding members of the world community. As Diane Amann has observed,
"[s]oberly recording events ... may affect the understandings and actions of all
in society, law-abiders as well as lawbreakers. 336 Extended, highly emotional
accounts from victims risk violating the important teachings of procedural
justice, elucidated by the work of Tom Tyler and others.3 37 Even if one cares not
what Zacarias Moussaoui, Timothy McVeigh, or Charles Taylor as individuals
think about the fairness of their trials, it remains the case that other, future mass
killers are watching, and perceived procedural impropriety risks aiding their
lethal cause. Moreover, sensitivity to the expressive ramifications of mass
killing prosecutions is especially warranted in light of the abiding concern that
what ought to be staid proceedings into theater in black robes .... The gravity of this concern for
international criminal law institutions, still in the process of securing legitimacy, is obvious"). For
discussion of the perceived procedural shortcomings of current international tribunals more generally,
see Jacob Katz Cogan, International Criminal Courts and Fair Trials: Difficulties and Prospects, 27
YALE J. INT'L L. 111 (2002); Christian DeFrancia, Due Process in International Criminal Courts: Why
Procedure Matters, 87 VA. L. REv. 1381 (2001).
333. TAYLOR, supra note 240, at 45; see also Mark S. Ellis, Achieving Justice Before the Interna-
tional War Crimes Tribunal: Challengesfor the Defense Counsel, 7 DuKE J. Comp. & INrr'L L. 519, 526
& n.37 (1997) (quoting Richard Goldstone, Chief Prosecutor for the ICTY) ("Whether there are
convictions or whether there are acquittals will not be the yardstick [of the ICTY]. The measure is
going to be the fairness of the proceedings .... ").
334. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
335. See, e.g., Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovid & John Hagen, The Politics of Punishment and the Siege of
Sarajevo: Toward a Conflict Theory of Perceived International (In)Justice, 40 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 369,
369 (2006) (discussing the "suspicions of racial/ethnic and cultural biases in deliberations and decisions
[and] prioritization of purposes in sentencing decisions" in the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia and reporting results of surveys that "indicate that the citizens of Sarajevo
increasingly believe[d] that the ICTY is politically influenced").
336. Amann, supra note 332, at 132.
337. See, e.g., E. ALLEN LNm & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSnCE
(1988); TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. Huo, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC COOPERATION WITH THE
POLICE A" COURTS (2002).
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international tribunals lack meaningful deterrent effect.33
Pragmatic considerations also counsel against international adoption of VIE.
The U.S. justice system, as noted above, shows obvious strains in its airing of
VIE, with judges, lawyers, and jurors often proving ill-equipped to handle the
emotionally fraught testimony.339 In Eichmann, this clash of legalism and
pathos was famously highlighted when one of the government's chief witnesses,
after being prodded by the court to answer questions in more concise, non-
narrative. form, fainted when testifying.34° Similarly, in the ICTY witnesses
have struggled to provide information on the horrendous harms they suffered
only to be reprimanded and cajoled by courts to provide "factual," abbreviated
accounts bereft of emotion. For instance, in the trial of Radislav Krstic, where
the prosecutor's strategy was to broaden the trial's focus beyond the actions of
the defendant to the suffering of individual victims, witnesses were urged to
simply state the names of decedents and other basic biographical informa-
tion.34 1 And when witnesses were permitted by the court to briefly speak more
expansively of their hardships, at the conclusion of their testimony, their input
was met with awkward responses that bordered on self-righteous patronization.
After hearing from one witness, for instance, a presiding judge lectured:
Very well .... You have told us about your suffering. Thank you. You showed
great courage in coming and testifying here. You have also given evidence of
your spirit of tolerance. I believe I speak in the name of my colleagues when I
tell you that we all wish you a happy return to your home. Yes, those places
were witness to suffering, but they should also be witness to tolerance and
peace. Injustice, wherever, shall always be a threat to everybody. 342
Equally troubling was this exchange in the same trial:
[Witness:] I have lost a number of relatives and cousins and people who
could have helped me, but today I have to help their children, and it's very
difficult for me to help anyone. I am barely surviving.
[Court:] We are very happy that you have survived.
[Witness:] Yes, I was lucky. Yes, that's what I keep telling myself, but
what's it worth now? My life has been damaged, my health ....
338. See MARTHA MINOw, BETwEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE
AND MASS VIOLENCE 49-50 (1998); Julian Ku & Jide Nzelibe, Do International Criminal Tribunals
Deter or Exacerbate Humanitarian Atrocities? 84 WASH. U. L.R. 777, 831-33 (2006); see also THE
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 12 (2006) (acknowledging that "[tihe
hard core of the terrorists cannot be deterred or reformed").
339. See, e.g., supra note 165 and accompanying text.
340. ARENDT, supra note 12, at 224.
341. Marie-B6nddicte Dembour & Emily Haslam, Silencing Hearings? Victim-Witnesses at War
Crimes Trials, 15 EuR. J. INT'L L. 151, 159-60 (2004).
342. Id. at 172.
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[Court:] Well, I think that will pass with time. You're still a young man. 34 3
Reflecting on these and other difficulties of victim-witnesses before the tribu-
nals, two commentators recently offered that "[flar from giving the victims a
hearing, they may leave them feeling silenced. Attempting to create a space for
victims within the legal arena may be misguided.",
344
However, even presuming existence of the requisite skill on the part of
questioners, concern remains over the anti-therapeutic nature of the courtroom
experience itself. Just as there is reason to doubt whether VIE benefits U.S.
witnesses,345 testifying in international trials can be problematic. As Eric Stover
has observed:
Telling one's story can be intensely emotional, especially for those who
have never told it publicly before. One can hardly expect victims and wit-
nesses to come to a state of "psychological healing" after recounting a highly
traumatic experience in a public setting that in and of itself may be threaten-
ing.... This is why ... war crimes tribunals ... should not be viewed as
vehicles for individual psychological healing or moral pedagogy in the after-
math of genocide and ethnic cleansing.346
Likewise, the high-profile, frequently confrontational nature of mass killing
trials, wherein defendants often lack contrition and any discernible trace of
empathy, is ready-made to be hurtful. In the ICTY, for instance, witnesses
testifying of their hardships have been rendered vulnerable to disdainful treat-
343. Id.; see also, e.g., id. at 175 n.97 (quoting ICTY judge's statement to victim: "We're very glad
that you managed to survive those terrible events that you were able to testify to. We wish you a safe
journey home and we hope that you will have a life that will give you reason to smile again.").
344. Id. at 175; see also EuzABETH NEuFFER, THE KEY TO My NEiGHBOR'S HOUSE 298 (2002) (noting
disappointment among ICTY witnesses stemming from limits imposed on their capacity to expand on
their sufferings).
345. See supra section m.A.3.
346. ERic STovER, THE WrrNEssEs: WAR CRIMES AND THE PROMISE OF JUSTICE IN THE HAGUE 32 (2005);
see also id. at 73 (concluding, on the basis of interviews with tribunal witnesses and available
psychiatric studies, that "survivors of mass atrocity should be cautious about testifying in court").
Stover's interviews with ICTY witnesses revealed that only fourteen percent found it cathartic to testify
of their war-time-based harms. Id. at 88; see generally Jamie O'Connell, Gambling with the Psyche:
Does Prosecuting Human Rights Violators Console Their Victims?, 46 HARV. INT'L L.J. 295, 331-35
(2005) (providing overview of other work done to date reflecting similar outcomes). For discussion of
anti-therapeutic consequences for witnesses in France's trial of Maurice Papon, see Wood, supra note
324, at 103-05. For surviving victims of sexual assault, in particular, the highly public narration of their
victimization, amid the pressures and constraints imposed by the trial rubric, can foster especially acute
re-traumatization. See Katherine M. Franke, Gendered Subjects of Transitional Justice, 15 COLUM.
J. GENDER & L. 813, 816-23 (2006). On the tribunals' prosecution of sexual assault, a frequent tool of
gender-based victimization and terror, see generally Andrea R. Phelps, Note, Gender-Based War
Crimes: Incidence and Effectiveness of International Criminal Prosecution, 12 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN
& L. 499 (2006).
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ment by defendants,347 just as in the U.S. trials surveyed earlier.348
Victim marginalization can also assume broader more categorical form.
Much as in the U.S. trials described earlier, transitional justice has evinced a
tendency for essentializing victims and creating a hierarchy of worthy sufferers.
In an effort to render a more effective narrative, Fionnuala Ni Aolain and
Catherine Turner note:
This hierarchy elevates certain privileged victims, often those whose experi-
ences parallel a particular political narrative of the conflict, or whose indi-
vidual circumstances have strong symbolic resonance for larger national or
ethno-political narratives. Left out by such maneuverings are those whose
victimhood might be complex or compromised and whose story may serve to
complicate the narrative rather than giving it the linear coherence that broader
political objectives may demand.349
In a related sense, concern should also exist over the possible deployment of
VIE to achieve broader didactic ends of government. The Nuremberg tribunals
self-consciously eschewed such deployment. Eichmann's prosecution, on the
other hand, was regarded by the fledgling government of Israel as a prime
opportunity to convey its origin story and inspire a sense of collective iden-
tity.350 In the United States, as well, victim-centeredness afforded the govern-
ment substantial political benefit, especially in the wake of 9/11. 351 Similar
benefit can extend in the international context, as governments might seek to
distract attention from their not having intervened earlier to stem mass kill-
3-52ings, again regardless of whatever negative effects the tribunals might have
on victim-witnesses. In sum, if valid concern exists over the government
making undue strategic use of victims in conventional capital trials, 353 such
government deployment should raise as much, if not greater, concern when
nations jockey for positive status on the international stage.
Finally, much as in the United States, VIE would likely be of little practical
347. See, e.g., NEUFFER, supra note 344, at 301 (describing dismissive and disparaging behaviors of
ICTY defendants); cf. Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR 95-1-T, Judgment, 17
(May 27, 1999) (noting that in his trial before the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda the
defendant Ruzindana "smiled or laughed" as victims testified).
348. See supra notes 192-94 and accompanying text.
349. Fionnuala Ni Aolain & Catherine Turner, Gender Truth & Transition, 16 UCLA WOMEN's L.J.
229, 265 (2007) (footnote omitted).
350. SEGEv, supra note 302, at 336 (the trial "sought to design a national saga that would echo
through the generations"); id. at 328 (arguing that "[s]omething was required to unite Israeli society-
some collective experience, one that would be gripping, purifying, patriotic.. . a national catharsis").
351. See supra section W.A.
352. See Payamn Akhavan, Justice in The Hague, Peace in the Former Yugoslavia? A Commentary
on the United Nations War Crimes Tribunal, 20 HUM. RTS. Q. 737, 745 (1998) (expressing concern that
tribunals might function to excuse prompt action in the face of atrocities and thus might serve as
nothing more than "cynical theater").
353. See generally MAmus DmK DUBBER, VIcTIms IN THE WAR ON CRIME: THE UsEs AND A13usES OF
VcrTas' RIGHTs (2002).
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legal effect. In the ICTR, for instance, where "gravity of the offense" serves as
the "litmus test for the appropriate sentence," '354 gravity seemingly functions
only to render the acts in question eligible for tribunal action. As Robert Sloane
has recently written, "[e]very act of genocide and virtually every act prosecuted
under the rubric of crimes against humanity (extermination, rape, murder,
torture) is extremely grave. 35 5 Sentences, rather, turn mainly on the alternate
consideration of "individual circumstances of the convicted person. 356 As a
result, as in Eichmann, where Hannah Arendt observed the facts establishing his
culpability "had been established 'beyond reasonable doubt' long before the
trial started, 357 and in the U.S. trials surveyed earlier,358 such evidence lacked
manifest legal purpose in the face of the enormity of the harm perpetrated.
The foregoing discussion has sought to highlight the difficulties presented by
possible use of VIE in international mass killing prosecutions. Analysis of the
competing legal paradigms of Nuremberg and Eichmann, in particular, however,
should not be taken as so exclusive as to admit of no compromise.359 Indeed,
evidence relating to victims' personal traits, harm (to the direct victim, cer-
tainly), the number of persons a defendant has killed, and any particular cruelty
shown bear obvious importance in both criminal culpability and punishment
assessments.36 ° Moreover, the discussion here in no way should be taken as
being critical of recent international efforts to ensure the well-being and partici-
pation of victim-witnesses more generally.361 U.S.-style VIE, however, differs
354. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, 413 (June 1,
2001) (internal citations omitted).
355. Sloane, supra note 287, at 722.
356. Id. at 723. In addition, considerations of "gravity," Sloane notes, tend to be conflated with, and
duplicate, other sentencing considerations, id. at 722-24, much as VIE has confounded related death
penalty criteria in U.S. courts. See, e.g., United States v. Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d 290, 299-300
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (deeming non-statutory aggravating factor "serious injury to surviving victims" to be
subsumed by VIE because "[b]oth function to provide the jury with details concerning the widespread
human trauma allegedly caused by the accused's criminal conduct").
357. ARENDT, supra note 12, at 56.
358. See supra Part 1I.
359. Aside from their historical significance, Nuremburg and Eichmann uniquely benefited from an
unprecedented wealth of documentary evidence left behind by the Third Reich. See Patricia M. Wald,
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Comes of Age: Some Observations on
Day-to-Day Dilemmas of an International Court, 5 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 87, 107 (2001). This
documentation played a central role in the Nuremberg trials. See id. The Israeli government in its
prosecution of Eichmann similarly benefited from the Nazi's paper trail but elected to make its case
mainly by means of witness testimony. Contemporary atrocities typically lack such extensive documen-
tary support, necessitating that victim-witnesses play a greater role in prosecutions. See id. However,
the need for this greater involvement does not compel the admission of VIE-type testimony from the
witnesses.
360. Cf M. CHmRaF BASSIOUNI, INTRODUCrION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 327-28 (2003).
Likewise, in the United States, such considerations figure in the capital decisionmaking process,
independent of VIE. See 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3591-3593 (West 2000 & Supp. 2007).
361. On the benefits of enhanced victim participation in the criminal justice process, including
provision of notice and opportunity for input, see Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in
Criminal Procedure, 81 N.Y.U. L. REv. 911, 952-55 (2006) (identifying benefits of increased crime
victim involvement).
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in kind and degree from such facets of international criminal justice, leaving
unresolved the evidentiary role that victims should properly play in mass killing
prosecutions.
As noted, the time is ripe for this inquiry, as international justice protocols
continue to evolve. One aspect of this evolution is the current interest in
bifurcation of the guilt and punishment phases of mass killing prosecutions.
While the ad hoc international criminal tribunals currently eschew bifurca-
362tion, the Rome Statute governing the ICC presumptively establishes use of a
distinct sentencing phase,3 63 envisioning consideration of aggravating and miti-
gating factors, including in the former category the "extent of the damage
caused, in particular the harm caused to the victims and their families.,, 3 ' To
commentators, bifurcation promises numerous benefits, including a fairer, more
orderly process in which defendants can avoid the dilemma of being forced to
reveal mitigating sentencing information at the possible risk of incriminating
themselves with respect to guilt.365 Bifurcation can also lessen the threat that
inflammatory evidence relevant to sentencing will taint guilt or innocence
determinations.366 It will also, as one commentator has urged, possibly facilitate
development of a "mature jurisprudence" of sentencing, "one of the most
significant international values" the tribunals "can realistically serve., 3 67
In pursuing this approach, however, the international community should be
mindful of the U.S. experience, where thirty years ago similar concern over
lawless capital trials prompted bifurcation of the guilt and punishment phases.368
While laudable for its intent to remedy the systemic arbitrariness of the pre-
Furman era, the regime has nonetheless proved a manifest failure in numerous
critical respects.369 In its effort to at once increase the amount of information
362. See Sean D. Murphy, Progress and Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia, 93 Am. J. INT'L L. 57, 92 (1999) (noting that the ICTY amended its rules to
require determination of guilt and sentencing at the same time). Early on, the ICTY experimented with
separate sentencing hearings but abandoned them due to "expedience and cost" concerns. See Sloane,
supra note 287, at 734. Nuremberg trials, similarly, did not bifurcate. See William A. Schabas,
Sentencing by International Tribunals: A Human Rights Approach, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 461,
461 (1997).
363. See GEERT-JAN ALEXANDER KNOOPS, AN INTRODUCrlON To THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBuNAs: A CoMPARATIvE STUDY 117 (2003).
364. See I.C.C. R.P. & EvID. 145(1)(C).
365. See RALPH HENHAM, PUNISHMENT AND PROCESS IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIALS 61-62 (2005);
KNooPs, supra note 363, at 117.
366. See Robert D. Sloane, The Expressive Capacity of International Punishment: The Limits of the
National Law Analogy and the Potential of International Criminal Law, 43 STAN. J. INT'L L. 39, 93
(2007).
367. Sloane, supra note 287, at 734.
368. On this evolution, commencing with Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), which invali-
dated all U.S. capital regimes in existence, through Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), which
inspired the bifurcated approach now operative throughout the United States, see generally AMERICA'S
EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT" REFLECTIONS ON THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF THE ULTIMATE
PENAL SANCTION (James R. Acker et al. eds., 1998); James S. Liebman, Slow Dancing with Death: The
Supreme Court and Capital Punishment, 1963-2006, 107 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (2007).
369. For discussion of the failed hope of Furman, see Logan, supra note 197, at 1341-45.
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provided to the sentencing authority (as evidenced in Payne), yet maintain a
semblance of reasoned deliberation based on guided discretion, U.S. law has
erred in favor of the former. The result has been a "state of acute system
overload... symboliz[ing] a system that has thrown up its hands in frustration
with its inability to accommodate all relevant interests within a framework of
meaningful rules., 370 Emblematic of this concern, a handful of U.S. federal
courts have of late endorsed use of double-bifurcation, or "trifurcation," allow-
ing introduction of VIE only after the jury finds the requisite threshold mens rea
and statutory aggravating factors.37'
The overload, while troublesome enough with conventional capital trials,
becomes significantly more problematic in the context of mass killings, where
unconstrained use of VIE has overwhelmed U.S. sentencing phase proceedings.
Again, the concern is not that this domination is problematic because it preor-
dains imposition of the harshest sanction available under law. Indeed, the U.S.
record directly refutes any such inference. Rather, concern lies in the capacity of
VIE to inundate prosecutions and infuse them with a pathos and individualiza-
tion that subverts the prosecution process and undermines its legitimacy.
In light of this, a preferable path for allowing victims' voices to be heard lies
in an undertaking independent of the criminal process, based on experience thus
far with truth and reconciliation commissions.37 2 With mass killings, of course,
reconciliation is often neither desired nor appropriate as an exclusive re-
sponse. 373 Rather, criminal accountability and public decisions on appropriate
punishment, as in each of the U.S. capital trials surveyed earlier, are in order.
Still, a commission-like forum would serve a very valuable complementary role
in tandem with prosecutions.374 The undertaking would allow for public augmen-
tation of the historical record, a goal known to be of critical importance to
370. Markus Dirk Dubber, Regulating the Tender Heart When the Axe Is Ready To Strike, 41 BuFF.
L. REV. 85,155 (1993). According to Professor Dubber, "[t]he current disarray in capital jurisprudence
accurately reflects the uneasy compromise that must plague any system designed to accommodate our
compassion for the victims of capital crimes while preserving the dignity of those whose lives it puts at
stake." Id.
371. See Logan, supra note 57, at 6, 10 n.31 (citing decisions).
372. See MARK FREEMAN, Tutru CoMmnssIoNS AND PRocEURAL FANmSS 71-72 (2006) (distinguish-
ing procedures in truth commissions and criminal courts and noting that the former allow for greater
victim-centeredness); id. at 223 (asserting that the "privileged public platform for victims" of a truth
commission allows for heightened public understanding of victim harm). On the relative utility of
prosecution and truth commissions more generally, see, for example, PiusCtLA B. HAYNER, UNSPEAK-
ABLE TRurrns: CONFRONTING STATE TERROR AND ATRocrry 135-40, 207-12 (2001).
373. See generally Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty To Prosecute Human Rights
Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALu L.J. 2537 (1991); cf. Elizabeth Kiss, Moral Ambition Within
and Beyond Political Constraints: Reflections on Restorative Justice, in TRurrm v. JusncE 68, 72 (Robert
I. Rotberg & Dennis Thompson eds., 2000) (asserting that truth commissions do "a disservice to
survivors who regard themselves not as patients in need of healing but as citizens entitled to justice").
374. As Robert Sloane recently observed, "[e]ven if international law now creates a duty to
prosecute under some circumstances, it surely does not prohibit complementary mechanisms for
confronting the daunting political, social, and legal issues" attending atrocities. Sloane, supra note 366,
at 46 (footnotes omitted). Priscilla Hayner likewise notes:
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victims, 375 in an environment hopefully more conducive to their recovery, while
permitting the formal criminal process to remain free of the difficulties noted
above.
A critical challenge, of course, would lie in obtaining adequate operational
funds. It would indeed be appropriate if funding were to be obtained from the
transgressors themselves. As it happens, ICC provisions now allow courts to
impose (in addition to sentences of imprisonment) fines that are to be placed in
an ICC Trust Fund for victims. 3 7 6 Ideally, these resources could be augmented
by contributions from ICC signatories and other parties, as permitted by the
ICC. 3 7 7 As important as providing financial support, the international commu-
nity must be prepared to regard the mission of such a forum as a first-order
priority. For if the world is serious about securing justice for those accused of
mass killings, it must be just as serious about ensuring the public chronicling of
the horrendous harms for which they are responsible and the healing, to the
extent possible, of those individuals who have endured them.
CONCLUSION
"To respond to mass atrocity with legal prosecutions," Professor Martha
Minow once observed, "is to embrace the rule of law."'3 7 8 While lending support
to this verity, this Article also confirms that, with the victims' rights movement
ascendant, the rule of law itself admits of different meanings. In the United
States, victim impact evidence has rendered conventional capital trials decid-
edly victim-centered, and despite the political controversy attending this shift,
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the same quality now infuses mass killing capital trials. As discussed, this
Nonjudicial truth bodies do not and should not be seen to replace judicial action against
perpetrators, and neither victims nor societies at large have understood them to do so in those
countries where truth commissions have been put in place. While their subject matters may
overlap ... trials and commissions serve different purposes, and neither can fill the role of the
other.
HAYNER, supra note 372, at 87. Consistent with this view, the Sierra Leone Special Court commissioned
a reconciliation commission to operate parallel to legal proceedings. See Franke, supra note 346, at
825-26.
375. See VIcrIMs OF WAR: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY ON WAR-VICIMIZATION AND VIcnIs' ATrrruDES
TOwARDs ADDRESSING ATROCITIES 123 (Ernesto Kiza et'al. eds, 2006) (noting that sixty-six percent of
victims surveyed cited the creation of a historical record as the main purpose of holding offenders to
account); Anne Orford, Commissioning the Truth, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 851, 855-59 (2006)
(surveying literature supporting the significance to individuals and societies of public airing of abuses).
376. See generally Sam Garkawe, Victims and the International Criminal Court: Three Major
Issues, INT'L CRrm. L. REV. 345, 363 (2003).
377. See generally Regulations of the Trust Fund for Victims, ICC-ASP/4/REs.3 (Dec. 3, 2005).
378. MINow, supra note 338, at 25.
379. Compare Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 834 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (asserting that
barring victim impact evidence "conflicts with a public sense of justice keen enough that it has found
voice in a nationwide 'victims' rights' movement"), with id. at 859 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that
the Payne "majority has obviously been moved by an argument that has strong political appeal but no
proper place in a reasoned judicial opinion").
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migration has not been seamless, with the admission of VIE exacerbating
difficulties common to conventional capital trials and creating new ones. More-
over, principled questions exist over the role of VIE itself in such trials, in light
of their unique nature.
Nevertheless, given its potent allure, strong reason exists to believe that VIE
will continue to dominate future mass killing prosecutions in U.S. civilian
courts, and should they come to pass, the prosecutions of alien unlawful enemy
combatants,3 8 0 by military commissions (the rules of which already contemplate
some use of VIE).38' In addition, for reasons discussed, in coming years the
international community will very likely be obliged to address whether VIE has
a proper place. In contemplating this migration, however, authorities should
remain mindful of recent U.S. experience with VIE in mass killing prosecu-
tions, as well as how VIE affects the world's perception of the way in which
mass killers are held accountable for their acts of depravity.
380. Such individuals would include Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, the alleged mastermind of the
September 11, 2001 attacks, now in U.S. custody. See Neil A. Lewis, Officials See Qaeda Trials Using
New Law in 2007, N.Y ThMms, Nov. 3, 2006, at A5.
381. See THE MANUAL FOR MILrrARY COMMISSIONS: RuLEs FOR MILITARY COMMISSIONs R. 1001(b)(2),
1004(b)(2) (2007), available at http:llwww.loc.gov/rr/frdlMilitary-Law/pdflmanual-mil-comnissions.
pdf. Time will tell whether the commissions will become a preferred venue for such cases. Since 9/11,
debate has of course raged over whether terror suspects should be prosecuted in civilian or military
courts or some other form of hybrid tribunal such as the commissions. See generally Diane Marie
Amann, Punish or Surveil, 16 TRANSNAT'L L. & CoNTEWM. PROBS. 873 (2007). Ongoing controversy over
the commissions, as well as the successful recent prosecution of Jose Padilla in federal civilian court,
after many years of governmental trepidation over jurisdiction, makes resort to the civilian criminal
justice system all the more likely. See Adam Liptak, A New Model of Terror Trial, N.Y. TrmEs, Aug. 18,
2007, at AO.
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